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Abstract
Current theoretical and computational models of dopamine-based reinforcement learning are largely rooted
in the classical behaviorist tradition, and envision the organism as a purely reactive recipient of rewards and
punishments, with resulting behavior that essentially reflects the sum of this reinforcement history. This
framework is missing some fundamental features of the affective nervous system, most importantly, the
central role of goals in driving and organizing behavior in a teleological manner. Even when goal-directed
behaviors are considered in current frameworks, they are typically conceived of as arising in reaction to the
environment, rather than being in place from the start. We hypothesize that goal-driven cognition is primary,
and organized into two discrete phases: goal selection and goal engaged, which each have a substantially
different effective value function. This dichotomy can potentially explain a wide range of phenomena,
playing a central role in many clinical disorders, such as depression, OCD, ADHD, and PTSD, and providing
a sensible account of the detailed biology and function of the dopamine system and larger limbic system,
including critical ventral and medial prefrontal cortex. Computationally, reasoning backward from active
goals to action selection is more tractable than projecting alternative action choices forward to compute
possible outcomes. An explicit computational model of these brain areas and their function in this goal-
driven framework is described, as are numerous testable predictions from this framework.
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Introduction
There are two countervailing perspectives at work in the minds of those who study human cognition and
behavior, which can lead to an apparent contradiction regarding the chain of causal events driving behavior.
The first perspective is a simplistic temporal model of causality, adopted by the behaviorists, which tells us
that, in the normal flow of events, stimuli (states of the world) trigger actions, which then produce outcomes
(new states of the world). But, our own day-to-day experience tells us that much of the time it is instead our
goals (mental representations of desired future states of the world) that determine our actions, which then
lead to new states of the world (which can then be compared with those envisioned in our goals). These two
perspectives work against each other, especially in the context of typical experimental paradigms, because
we usually try our best to eliminate any contamination from a subject’s own set of internal goals, and impose
our own instead. We then carefully analyze the patterns of actions and outcomes that arise in response to the
stimuli that we have presented. This then leads to a kind of reverse fundamental attribution error: we tend
to underestimate the role of goals in driving people’s behavior. This has led to somewhat of a bifurcation
across different disciplines: in social, personality, and organizational psychology, where motivation and the
role of goals in driving behavior is extensively recognized (e.g., Locke, 1968Locke & Latham, 2002Ban-
dura, 1977Bandura, 2001Carver & Scheier, 1982Svebak & Murgatroyd, 1985Kunda, 1990Carver & Scheier,
1990Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003Ajzen, 1991Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011). How-
ever, in the cognitive neurosciences, which have only more recently begun to address fundamental questions
in the motivation of behavior, the critical role played by goals is somewhat less clearly recognized.
In particular, the computational paradigm of reinforcement learning (RL), which has largely followed
in the behaviorist tradition by emphasizing stimulus – response (S-R) learning, has become quite promi-
nent (Sutton, 1988Sutton & Barto, 1990Sutton & Barto, 1998Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996Schultz,
Dayan, & Montague, 1997Schultz, 1998Hollerman & Schultz, 1998Schultz & Dickinson, 2000Waelti, Dick-
inson, & Schultz, 2001). In the RL framework, actions (triggered by stimuli or states in the environment)
that lead to reward are reinforced, and performed more frequently under similar states in the future, while
those that lead to less reward (or overt punishment) are attenuated (Thorndike’s Law of Effect; Thorndike,
1911). Recently, a new distinction between model-free and model-based forms of RL has become an area
of active exploration (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005Dayan, 2009Rangel & Hare, 2010). While model-free RL
is the standard S-R-O form, model-based approaches use an internal model of the environment to anticipate
the potential outcomes of a sequence of actions, making action-choices based on these forward projections.
We argue that the typical framing of even this newer model-based framework, a form of what-if analysis,
still has things subtly backward in reference to the vast majority of human experience. Instead, behavior is
fundamentally goal-driven in an explicitly teleological way, where we are selecting actions for the most part
because they are likely to bring about a specific state of the world envisioned by a currently active goal. In
addition to being more computationally tractable (the forward projection process becomes intractable sur-
prisingly quickly; Newell & Simon, 1976Solway & Botvinick, 2012), we are finding that such a goals-first
perspective leads to many important insights at both the behavioral and neural levels.
The central goal of this paper is to develop a biologically informed and constrained computational frame-
work based on the idea that much of cognition starts with goals, and that the architecture of cognition actu-
ally implemented in our brains is fundamentally structured in this goals first fashion. Our main hypothesis
is that there are two qualitatively different states of mental life: goal selection vs. goal engaged, and that
they have qualitatively different effective value functions, which can explain many seeming paradoxes as
elaborated below. The system is strongly motivated to have at least one active goal engaged at any given
time, but it also very carefully weighs the cost-benefit tradeoffs of possible goals during the goal selection
phase. This is because once a goal becomes engaged, progress toward that goal then dominates the effective
value function — we are strongly motivated to achieve our goals, once they have been selected and en-
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gaged. In addition to these main novel hypotheses, we elaborate a computational framework for how goals
drive actions, which shares some features with various other frameworks, most notably that articulated by
Pezzulo and Castelfranchi (2009). This framework is implemented in a biologically-based computational
model that demonstrates the basic sufficiency and operation of these principles, and serves as a platform for
further development and testing of the theory. As we proceed, we attempt to make contact with relevant
work from the long history of scholarship in the domain of goal-driven behavior (Zeigarnik, 1927Lewin,
1928Tolman, 1932Tolman, 1948Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960Powers, 1973Klinger, 1975Gollwitzer,
1993) (see Austin & Vancouver, 1996 for a thorough review, and the other references mentioned above on
active work in areas outside of cognitive neuroscience).
The framework outlined here builds upon widely accepted ideas in the neuroscience of affective be-
havior and cognitive control. In particular, ventral and medial regions of the prefrontal cortex (v/mPFC),
including the orbital frontal cortex (OFC) and the medial wall including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
are important for representing affective states of various sorts, including what might be called “hot” (affec-
tively meaningful) goals (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998Frank & Claus, 2006Noonan, Walton, Behrens, Sallet,
Buckley, & Rushworth, 2010Ongu¨r & Price, 2000Pauli, Hazy, & O’Reilly, 2012bSaddoris, Gallagher, &
Schoenbaum, 2005Schoenbaum, 2004Schoenbaum, Chiba, & Gallagher, 2000Schoenbaum, Roesch, Stal-
naker, & Takahashi, 2009Schoenbaum & Setlow, 2001Price & Drevets, 2010Amitai Shenhav, 2013). By
virtue of their affective grounding, the activations of these v/mPFC regions exerts a far-reaching, energizing
influence on processing throughout the brain, including the important executive control areas in lateral PFC,
particularly dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC). These “higher” cognitive areas can be seen as subserving the selec-
tion and active maintenance of what might be called “cold” goals (or task set representations; Rogers &
Monsell, 1995), which can then provide focused, top-down biasing to influence processing elsewhere in
the brain in a cognitively-framed, task-focused manner (e.g., Fuster & Alexander, 1971Goldman-Rakic,
1987O’Reilly, Braver, & Cohen, 1999Miller & Cohen, 2001). Our focus in this paper is much more on
the “hot” side of goals, as compared with the more cybernetic, control-theory oriented focus of many
other computationally-based frameworks (Miller et al., 1960Powers, 1973Wolpert & Kawato, 1998Hom-
mel, 2004Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 2009).
Motivation and Principles
The following questions about observations in daily life (in the first person perspective of the first author)
were important for motivating the overall goal-driven framework developed here, and serve as a concrete, if
anecdotal, springboard for the set of principles to follow:
• Why are my kids so agitated when they don’t have something specific to do right now, and why can
they get so obsessed with building Legos and playing video games?
• Why is it so important to have a progress meter on exercise equipment, and why can’t I stop myself
from organizing my kid’s Legos, or cleaning the pool?
• Why do I sometimes feel completely overwhelmed, and other times completely in control, when
facing the same abyss of an inbox filled with hundreds of possibly important things requiring my
attention?
• Why do I reliably cross the street at different points on the way to a given destination, compared to
the way back, crossing at the earliest point in each trajectory?
• Why does our field persist in exhibiting extreme confirmation bias (and other similar such biases),
when everyone knows this is a major problem?
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• Why doesn’t my computational model know when it has achieved a subgoal, and can then move on to
a new step, and give itself a little shot of intermediate reward?
After introducing the following principles that constitute the core of our theoretical framework, we apply
these principles to the above questions, and then to a broad set of neural and behavioral data.
Principle 1: Active goals are primary, and there must be at least one engaged at all times. These
active goals must be concrete, with a clear criterion for accomplishment (a clear end), with a perceptual
component that supports the ability to track progress toward the goal (Locke, 1968Locke & Latham, 2002),
and at least a general action plan for how to proceed. The time horizon for accomplishment can be variable,
but probably no longer than hours to perhaps a few days, with this horizon likely dependent on species,
age and various personality factors. Being in a state without such a goal active is aversive, and the system
works assiduously to remedy this situation. Thus, we can parse our cognition into two discrete states: the
goal engaged state, and the goal selection state, and as we’ll see below, these states have strongly dissociable
properties. Goals can be nested and stacked, and multiple can potentially be engaged at a time, but more dis-
tal, latent goals must translate into more proximal active goals that have a more concrete near-time horizon,
which then tend to dominate the immediate sphere of cognition (in proportion to some dimension of inten-
sity). Klinger (1975) referred to these active goals as one’s current concerns, and articulated many of the
same implications of these engaged goals as we highlight below (this represents an independent replication,
as we only became aware of Klinger’s paper late in the writing process of this paper).
We use the term goal to denote a distributed representation that links three key components together: 1)
an affectively meaningful outcome; 2) stimulus representations that enable progress toward goal achieve-
ment to be estimated; and 3) action plans directed toward achieving the outcome. Because of this critical
link with affectively meaningful outcomes, these goals can be considered “hot” goals in contrast to just the
“cold” plans and strategies thought to be encoded in the dlPFC (although the degree of “hotness” certainly
varies — everyday goals may not seem all that hot). Operationally, a goal is something that, when achieved
leads to happiness or satisfaction, when obstructed leads to frustration (Amsel, 1962) or anger, and when
abandoned leads to disappointment or sadness — these are the signature emotions surrounding the goal ac-
tivation system. Furthermore, goals do not need to be explicit, consciously considered things (and perhaps
subconscious goals are much more prevalent, which is why we tend to take them for granted) — goals can
exist at many different levels and under many different influences, spanning everything from basic drives to
seek food to very high-level cognitive goals. Goals differ from affective states (e.g., being hungry, happy,
or sad) in that they drive behavior toward a specific, perceptually-defined end state — being hungry can
lead to the selection of a goal to eat, but this requires a specific goal selection process, and is not automatic
(depending on the circumstances, hunger can be ignored while pursuing other goals). See Figure 2 below
for specific examples that can help to clarify these relationships.
Despite any residual definitional ambiguities surrounding this term, the strong claim is that the notion of
an active goal is completely unambiguous in the brain. There are special areas of the brain (e.g., v/mPFC,
ventral striatum, amygdala, and various brainstem nuclei) that are endowed with the power to select, repre-
sent, maintain, and monitor goal states, and have the appropriate connections for these goal states to drive
lower-level reward systems, and actions. All of these issues are discussed in greater detail in what follows,
and rendered more fully explicit in our computational modeling framework. We are mindful of the tauto-
logical trap lurking in any discussion of goals (e.g., where anything and everything that drives behavior is
labeled as a goal), and we think the constraints of explicit computational models are particularly important
in avoiding this problem.
Principle 2: Once activated, progress toward goals drives incremental dopamine release, and rein-
forces actions taken (and subgoals) toward these goal states. There are multiple overlapping dimensions
of progress, including estimated time to achievement, degree of uncertainty of achievement, and basic per-
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ceptual distance from the goal state. The best kind of progress is gradual and steady, which leads to steady
delivery of dopamine over time — it is nearly impossible to stop oneself from working toward goals with a
near time horizon (order minutes) and steady indicators of progress, with small challenges to overcome at
each step. This is the recipe for all things that lead to seemingly inexplicable obsessions, from video games
to obsessive cleaning and organizing, etc. Solitaire is a particularly devilish combination of organizing and
incremental progress — it is striking how many people on airplane flights are playing this evil game. Com-
puter programming, for certain people, also fits this bill quite nicely, and the hours just melt away. Stories
(in movies and books) also tap into this same essential dynamic: a good story sets up a goal in the form
of a mystery or unresolved question (the hook), and keeps doling out incremental progress toward that goal
along the way. Indeed, is there anything (aside from more basic drives such as hunger, sex, etc) that we
derive high levels of pleasure from, that does not fit this general description? Even with the more basic level
goals, it is important to be mindful of this graded progress dynamic: sitting down with a large quantity of
tasty food (e.g., a large bag of popcorn, a full pint of ice cream – you know the drill) is an invitation to over-
dose, as each step of “progress” toward the “goal” of “cleaning out that container” drives you ever onward.
This idea is largely consistent with Bouton’s (Bouton, 2011) theory of the importance of context, where
the context acts as stimulus associated with the reinforcement of the next response, making it more difficult
to stop appetitive behaviors, but we reframe it so that the goal state itself, arising from a joint function of
contextual cues and internal states, provides the essential motivation for actions achieving the current goal.
More broadly, the notion that cognition can be dominated by engaged goals is consistent with the motivated
reasoning framework (Kunda, 1990Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006), and with the value
added by strength of engagement (Higgins, 2006).
Principle 3: It is relatively hard to activate new goals — the brain is at its most perfectionistic
in weighing costs and benefits at the goal selection phase. Whereas we seemingly don’t care a whit
about blowing hours and hours on meaningless activities such as solitaire once we’ve started down that
path, we do seem to care a great deal at the point of indecision when selecting the next goal to activate. It
can feel like a real chore to weigh the costs and benefits of all the options — which game should I play?
Which of the hundreds of pressing issues should I turn my attention to next? The inability to select that
next goal can be debilitating. Indeed, as we discuss in more detail later, it is certainly a major symptom,
if not the major cause, of depression, manifest as fatigue and motivational anhedonia (as contrasted with a
basic inability to experience pleasure) (Demyttenaere, De Fruyt, & Stahl, 2005Salamone, Correa, Farrar, &
Mingote, 2007Treadway & Zald, 2011Salamone & Correa, 2012). This dissociation between the value
system during the goal engaged and goal selection phases can be quite striking: even a strongly depressed
person can overcome their sadness if they manage to get engaged in a goal-driven activity, but at the next
goal selection opportunity, the abyss emerges once again. When you see such a strong dissociation, that is
a strong clue that something important is going on. It means that the goal selection process is extremely
important, and is where the value system is at its most balanced and critical in trying to optimize goal
selection to the greatest extent possible. As we elaborate below, perceptual inputs and other current state
variables also influence the goal selection process in important ways, and can make the selection process
much easier by limiting the space of options and giving a strong bias to one option over others. In any case,
once the value system becomes dominated by the active goal state, it can apparently become essentially
oblivious to the overall optimization of cost/benefit tradeoffs. Any progress toward the currently-active goal
delivers those dopamine bursts, even if you opted for an objectively worthless activity such as sorting pixels
representing cards into stacks on a computer screen. This dissociation makes good functional sense: once
you’ve decided upon a course of action, it doesn’t make sense to be constantly second-guessing things —
you have to give it a fair shake, and then reevaluate at the next choice point.
Principle 4: Despite the positive bias evident during the goal engagement stage, a more balanced
estimation of value does accumulate. Even though it may not have felt especially effortful (once the
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goal was engaged) to write a paper or pack for a trip, the next time that alternative is considered, a more
veridical sense of effort will weigh against engaging that goal, leading to inevitable procrastination. Indeed,
procrastination can be seen as the highly critical functioning of the goal selection process: if there are other
options that lead to higher expected utility (reward versus effort) then those are strongly favored, as, in
some objective sense, they should be. It is actually somewhat of a miracle that people can manage to select
higher-effort goals at all, and as we discuss later, there are important tricks that people can use to game the
goal selection process to their (longer-term) advantage. On the other side of the equation, even though a
trashy novel or bad movie can keep you engaged, at the end there is a clearer reckoning of the overall reward
value. How many times have you actually managed to walk out (or turn off the TV) while watching a bad
movie, compared to how carefully you evaluate the options prior to watching? Overall, this points to another
important dissociation, where latent knowledge is accumulated without influencing behavior at the time.
Principle 5: Not all goals are achievable, and the system is poised to detect when to give up on a
given goal. Again despite the positive bias from goal engagement, a persistent lack of progress will lead to
various stages of strategy and goal reevaluation, which is affectively aversive (Carver & Scheier, 1990). This
is why the steady, gradual progress toward a goal is so important and so strongly rewarding — its opposite
is highly aversive, and indicates the potential need to abandon a goal. The balance between perseverance in
the face of challenge and flexibility in seeking new goals is an important dynamic with many tradeoffs, and
it is unclear if there is any obvious optimal set point. Certainly the population exhibits significant preserved
variability on this dimension, despite whatever selection pressures might be at work. In any case, it seems
clear that we are much more likely to try alternative plans or strategies (i.e., the cold dlPFC side of the
equation), rather than abandon an affective goal. We have greater attachment to our goals than our plans,
and giving up on a goal is a much bigger step than a change of plans — people experience disappointment
or get depressed when they give up on their goals, not when they have to adopt new strategies to achieve
their sustained goals.
Principle 6: Aversive goal is an oxymoron — all goals are fundamentally appetitive. When faced
with aversive situations, our goals then focus on ways to avoid or overcome adversity, and steady progress
toward doing so is just as motivating (if not more so) than progress toward a purely appetitive goal. It is im-
portant to carefully dissociate the goal from the actions required to achieve the goal, and the emotional state
experienced while undertaking the goal. Often we have to execute unpleasant actions to achieve important
goals, and we experience overriding negative affect, but the goal itself has been selected through this care-
ful weighing of costs and benefits, and represents a perceived necessary step toward subsequent happiness.
Taking out the trash, cleaning the house, and numerous other onerous tasks are executed not because of their
intrinsic pleasurable value, but because they have been evaluated as better to do than the alternative (and of
course there is always Sarah Cynthia Sylvia Stout, who refused to take the garbage out, but that didn’t end
very well). Surely some people find pleasure in causing harm to others, and some wallow in their misery, but
these ultimately are subjectively appetitive. In the latter case, wallowing and “misery loves company” are
adaptive coping strategies for distancing oneself from aversive emotions (by putting it “out there” instead of
keeping it inside), and by obtaining appetitive social support from others. Indeed, many of our goals derive
ultimately from social drives, and these can lead to apparent contradictions to the importance of appetitive
goal activation, as we discuss more later.
Principle 7: Goal activation is graded, and not everything is goal-driven. As a function of individual
differences, and various contextual and state factors (e.g., resting, sleeping, conserving energy), the degree
of activation on goal states (and arousal level more generally) can be graded. Sometimes you’re just chillin’,
and do not have any pressing needs to drive goal engagement (referred to as the paratelic state by Svebak &
Murgatroyd, 1985, as contrasted with the telic or goal-engaged state). Other times you’ve got multiple
urgent deadlines, or are facing a life-and-death emergency. Furthermore, some actions are habitual and not
under goal-driven control — the current goal state does not completely dominate all of cognition. As long as
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the cognitive system has at least one sufficient goal state activated, plenty of other actions and distractions
can be managed. While engaged in writing a paper, emails pop up and some of them require responses.
Food must be prepared and eaten. Various other obligations and responsibilities must be tended to. Many
elements of this behavior can potentially be characterized according to the classic habit learning system
described by model-free reinforcement learning systems. But if these things add up to a significant delay
in obtaining those steady perceptions of progress toward the most salient engaged goal of writing the paper,
then a sense of frustration can emerge, leading to various strategies for mitigating these distractions. As
noted above, this sense of frustration is a strong indicator of the presence of a goal — you don’t typically
feel frustration in the context of habitual behavior. Furthermore, when the engaged goals are strong and
strongly reinforced by graded progress, many other basic needs can be severely neglected, reportedly even
to the extreme where some people have died from multiple days of continuous video game play.
In summary, the present framework posits a strong dichotomy between two different phases of cognition,
goal selection and goal engaged, with goal selection being the prime directive of the organism. The rest of
cognition can only proceed once goal selection has occurred, and is largely (but not exclusively) subservient
to the activated goal(s). In short, we live life in intervals defined by the reign of these goal states, with the
potential for a crisis of succession at every juncture. In practice, there can be long periods of essentially
continuous goal engagement with subgoals driven by larger distal goals cascading and nesting, to carry
one along (perhaps a kind of “flow” state). But at some point, a point of reckoning comes where the way
forward is less clear, and it becomes difficult to settle on that next concrete goal, and the goal selection
process becomes more salient and onerous. And some times, nothing goes well at all, and all the gradients
seem to be negative, and you have difficulty even activating the goal to get out of bed. We discuss these
dynamics and individual differences therein later. But for now, with this toolkit in hand, we can address
those pressing questions raised above:
• Why are my kids so agitated when they don’t have something specific to do right now, and why can
they get so obsessed with building Legos and playing video games? Because having a proximal
appetitive goal is essential. As in many things, children can provide a clearer window into underlying
cognitive dynamics, unobfuscated by all the habits and complexity of adult value systems — it is truly
remarkable the rapid transition in mood and behavior that can occur when a goal has been engaged,
vs. the agitated state just prior. Indeed, it is generally thought that the tantrum state reflects a profound
state of frustration and/or disappointment due to the inability to achieve or engage a desired goal state.
You can safely reject the notion that a tantrum is a cold calculated attempt at manipulation (besides, the
energetics just don’t make sense): what you are witnessing is the raw power of goal-driven cognition,
and the kind of force that is unleashed when it is thwarted. As for the obsession, these activities, once
engaged, deliver steady gradual progress toward concrete achievable goals.
• Why is it so important to have a progress meter on exercise equipment, and why can’t I stop myself
from organizing my kid’s Legos, or cleaning the pool? You need to see progress toward a goal (or
progress toward cessation of an aversive state), and even a fruitless task such as organizing your
kid’s Legos (which will be undone in short order) delivers those inexorable rewards as you make
incremental progress.
• Why do I sometimes feel completely overwhelmed, and other times completely in control, when facing
the same abyss of an inbox filled with hundreds of possibly important things requiring my attention? It
all depends on whether you’re in a goal-engaged or a goal-selection (indecision) state. When engaged,
other pressing deadlines and onerous tasks just magically recede into the background. But upon
popping back out, they come right back with familiar feelings of dread and guilt. This can be rather
fleeting if there is an obvious next-most-urgent task, but if there are many seemingly undifferentiable
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and unappealing obligations, the feeling of indecision can be debilitating. One trick is to apply a
weak general method (a meta-goal) to the indecision state by creating a subgoal of prioritizing the
todo items, and then following that prioritized list instead of just staring into the abyss or doing
something mindlessly rewarding instead (see organizing kid’s Legos above). But it can be hard to get
over threshold to even do this prioritization step.
• Why do I reliably cross the street at different points on the way to a given destination, compared to
the way back, crossing at the earliest point in each trajectory? It is all about making the most salient
progress toward the goal as soon as possible — there is a lot of uncertainty in timing etc for crossing
the street, so you want to get that out of the way, so the remainder of the goal achievement is more
certain and more subjectively proximal.
• Why does our field persist in exhibiting extreme confirmation bias (and other similar such biases),
when everyone knows this is a major problem? It is hard to give up on a goal that you’ve worked
on for some amount of time (e.g., years). It is the same as the Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1927),
motivated reasoning (Westen et al., 2006), the the gambler’s fallacy — we have a very hard time
giving up on goals because these goals are primary, and we face the difficulty of goal selection and
indecision and a broader sense of lack of self-efficacy and control when we give up on our goals
(Bandura, 1977Bandura, 2001Maier & Seligman, 1976). These are the at-work forces. Mere facts
and principles are no match. At a larger scale, the Kuhnian structure of paradigm shifts followed by
within-paradigm scientific thinking follows this same general structure: the field clings to paradigms
as long as possible because they provide a structure and metric of progress and order. Having to cast
about for new paradigms is structurally aversive, and is only undertaken when the old ones are clearly
broken.
• Why doesn’t my computational model know when it has achieved a subgoal, and can then move on to
a new step, and give itself a shot of intermediate reward? Because these (earlier) models did not have
a special role for goals, and a constant measuring of distance to the active goal, so they just aimlessly
execute actions according to previous patterns of reinforcement, without knowing when anything
in particular has been achieved (or not). These models never get frustrated or disappointed. Until
computational models “feel” those core emotions, they will remain perpetually passive and lacking
the motivational foundation of cognition.
Overview of Proposed Computational Framework
In the remainder of the paper, we attempt to distill the above insights into a biologically-constrained
computational algorithm, leveraging known features of the relevant brain areas and mechanisms. An initial
implementation of this computational framework is then presented, and tested on a simple foraging task.
We hope that this kind of biologically-informed, neural network-based perspective will help crystalize some
of the key challenges inherent in a goal-centric perspective on cognition and make clear what it may add to
extant theorizing. While many unanswered questions remain, we think this framework significantly realigns
some of the principal dimensions of this problem domain in ways that may make the eventual solution easier.
Some of the central questions to be addressed include: 1) How do goals gain control of the central
neuromodulatory brain areas that project widely to the rest of the brain, and control learning and other
dynamics; 2) How do these neuromodulatory signals, along with direct activation dynamics, reinforce goal-
driven action plans, in the context of having a particular goal engaged? 3) How are new goals activated
during the goal selection process? 4) How is a suitable map of available goal representations learned, to
support flexible, adaptive behavior? In what follows we try to provide some initial answers to these and
other relevant questions.
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Figure 1: Schematic of the PV (primary value) and LV (learned value) components of the goal-driven version of the
PVLV algorithm (gdPVLV). The PV system compares primary outcomes (e.g., food) with expectations thereof (P̂ V ),
and any discrepancy drives phasic dopamine bursts (shown, because the expectation was below the outcome in this
case – a particularly tasty burger) or dips if the expectation is higher than the outcome (especially important if e.g.,
the restaurant is closed and you don’t get anything!). The LV system learns at the time of PV rewards about sensory
cues that can be used to anticipate subsequent PV outcomes, e.g., the logo of a restaurant — once learned, these can
drive phasic dopamine bursts (or dips, not shown) as a function of the perceived progress toward the goal. In this way
the dopamine system reinforces actions that progress toward the goal — e.g., the actions that bring you closer to the
restaurant. These actions and other factors may result in a more discrete step-function (and trigger the timing of phasic
dopamine firing), but the continuous curve shown captures the notion that perception defines a continuous metric for
evaluating goal progress.
The central features of the framework to be sketched out here build on our existing work with the
PVLV (primary value, learned value) model of phasic dopamine firing (O’Reilly, Frank, Hazy, & Watz,
2007Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2010), which drives learning in the striatum of the basal ganglia (Frank,
2005O’Reilly & Frank, 2006); which in turn drives selection of actions (at many different levels of abstrac-
tion) in the frontal cortex; which in turn drives cognitive control over processing elsewhere in the brain
(O’Reilly et al., 1999Miller & Cohen, 2001O’Reilly, 2006); which in turn feeds back to modulate process-
ing at all those lower levels, resulting in a highly-interactive system capable of complex emergent behavior.
In this paper we provide a preliminary description of how we are beginning to integrate a goals-centric
perspective into this existing framework. We have found that this process is already helping to clarify and
deepen our understanding of these foundational mechanisms in important ways, extending its explanatory
power. While our current framework remains dopamine-centered, we recognize the importance of other
neuromodulatory systems and have plans to incorporate these into our framework over time.
Here is a brief overview of the key features of this framework (relevant literature references are omitted
here for brevity, but are provided in the subsequent sections detailing each of these elements):
Core PVLV learning mechanisms: The goal processing system comprises an extensive set of special-
ized brain areas that are continually engaged in processing and being driven by primary affectively-relevant
outcomes (i.e., primary values, or PV in the PVLV framework). Some of these areas can learn to associate
these grounded primary values with other perceptual inputs (i.e., learned values or LV in the PVLV frame-
work), thereby alerting the system to the presence of specific opportunities (and threats) in its immediate
environment, and enabling the computation of a running estimate of the probability that particular primary
values will be experienced in the near future. In the context of a currently-engaged goal state, LV-signals can
thus indicate that the probability of goal-realization has changed. In the case of positive changes, the phasic
dopamine bursts so triggered can be interpreted as indicators of progress toward achieving the relevant goal
(Figure 1).
The relationship between goals and PVs: It stands to reason that all goals must be ultimately grounded
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Stimulus
empty stomach, etc
low h2o
predator, fear CS
wound, damage, etc
receptive mate
unexpected event
mess
special knowledge
special ability
in-group member
out-group member
Affective State
Hunger
Thirst
Fear
Pain
Lust
Curiosity
Disorder
Share
Impress
Love
Hate
PV Goal Outcome
food in mouth
water in mouth
safety / dead predator
orgasm
?
understanding
order
shared understanding
others impressed
affiliative feelings
protection of in-group
LV Progress
proximity to food
proximity to water
proximity to safety / gun
?
closeness..
sense of progress
visible state of order
other comprehension
oohh, ahhh
reciprocity
repulsion of out-group
take meds? learn to avoid
Action
find food, eat it
find water, drink it
climb tree / shoot gun
copulation
explore, test
organize
communication
performing action
hugging, helping..
aggression, war
social
survival
progress
goal achievement
abandoning goal
goal inactivation
Satisfaction, Happiness
Disappointment, Sadness
Boredom, Depression
goal
Active Goal
goal impediment Frustration, Anger impediment removed goal progress whatever it takes..
Figure 2: Relationship between affective states and PV outcomes for a set of core cases, ranging from basic survival
to more “progressive” values to a sample of core social values. The typical causal chain is that stimuli (internal or
external) drive activation of affective states, which then influence (depending on their intensity) the goal selection
process (but by no means completely determine it — many other factors can be taken into account as well). Once
a goal is activated, it has an associated PV outcome (always positively valenced (green)), an LV monitoring of goal
progress, and actions taken to advance the goal. Note that the motivating affective states can be either positive or
negative (red). The last three affective states are those associated with the goal process itself, which can be recognized
as completing a reasonable set of emotional or affective states (see text later for more possible such states, along with
a discussion of the Pain state).
in the hard-wired values that have been selected through evolution. Figure 2 provides some core examples of
how goal-associated positive PV outcomes can be motivated by a variety of affective states. While obviously
tightly related, the goal is not exactly isomorphic with these primary values — these values provide the
power to goals by driving the dopamine neuromodulatory learning system, and driving overall affective
states (e.g., hunger, thirst) that then provide activation for associated goals, so they are more likely to be
selected (but this is far from a guarantee — many such affective states can be ignored in favor of other
stronger goals). Note that appetitive PVs such as the positive reward associated with eating food can often
have a negative affective state driving them (e.g., hunger), so eating can actually be seen as harm avoidance
(avoiding starvation) rather than as a purely appetitive state. One potential connection between PVs and
goals comes from neurons in the ventral striatum that learn to expect primary value outcomes — these
neurons may also play a role in the gating of goal representations in v/mPFC (OFC and ACC). This creates
a potential linkage mechanism for PV outcomes to trigger goal deactivation after success (which is just as
important as initial goal selection), and LV signals associated with PVs can drive goal selection.
Open-ended PVs: social rewards, understanding, order: Despite the firm grounding in primary val-
ues, human cognition can be remarkably complex and flexible because our hard-wired reinforcers have come
to include (perhaps even be dominated by) a major component of social reinforcement. This in turn both sup-
ports, and is supported by, the powerful machinery of culture, which can then further shape our hard-wired
value structure in open-ended ways. In this way, culture itself has become a unit of selection with some sets
of cultural reinforcements ending up more adaptive than others. Through culture, we initially solve many
of the difficult problems of action selection through direct instruction and imitation, which then become
internalized and elaborated over time. Furthermore, our hard-wired reinforcers have come to include ab-
stract things such as new-found understanding, often manifest as the motivation we experience as curiosity.
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Similarly, we can experience a feeling of order as rewarding. These can fuel important goal systems as well
(again see Lego organization above). Thus, it has been possible for evolution to go well beyond primitive
reinforcers, but it is important to keep in mind that even the most abstract goals, such as completing a paper
about goals, must ultimately be rooted in one or more (evolutionarily-selected) hard-wired reinforcers in
some way. An important challenge in fleshing out a goal-centric framework going forward will be how to
properly capture the cocktail of hard-wired reinforcers in a concrete, mechanistically-explicit computational
model,
The development of a systematic goal space distributed across OFC, ACC, and dlPFC, intercon-
nected with associated subcortical areas: Another key challenge is to capture the way in which the devel-
opment, shaped by cultural and other learning experiences, enables us to acquire a rich semantic map of a
very high-dimensional goal space distributed across ventral / medial PFC (OFC and ACC) and other areas
of cortex. This goal space includes not only the universe of possible PV outcome states to be pursued, but
also links into the state-action control systems in lateral frontal areas and elsewhere to determine how best to
go about pursuing each. We believe that among the roles of the OFC is a specialization for encoding running
estimates of progress toward desired goal outcomes (primary values, PVs). Similarly, one of the roles of the
ACC is a specialization for processing the costs associated with specific ways of pursuing different possible
goals, computing a real-time representation of the net utility expected from each goal-state/action-plan pair.
Once acquired, such a goal space can support flexible goal selection in response to environmental and other
challenges, but clearly its acquisition involves a highly complicated interplay between nature and nurture,
including many years of hard work during the developmental learning process (even though this hard work
is often cleverly disguised as playtime).
A goal processing pyramid in the brain: There is a roughly hierarchical “pyramid” of goal process-
ing areas in the brain, which are likely to have developed progressively over evolution, with higher areas
elaborating and expanding upon the function of existing lower-level systems (the pyramid is inverted, with
more neural tissue at the higher end). This leads to considerable redundancy and complexity overall, and as
a practical matter we are thus forced to be selective and to focus (at least initially) on only the most central
computationally-relevant parts of the system, as present in mammals and especially primates. At the highest
level of the goal system, we focus on the v/mPFC areas (OFC, ACC) as the primary locus of goal represen-
tations, under the influence of basal ganglia gating neurons in the ventral striatum, which are also a key part
of the PVLV system. It is notable that the majority of the rodent prefrontal cortex (prelimbic and infralimbic
cortex) consists of analogs of the limbic v/mPFC areas in primates, with just a relatively small portion of
the dorsal aspect of the prelimbic cortex thought to be homologous to the vastly expanded lateral PFC areas
in primates (Narayanan, Horst, & Laubach, 2006). Thus, the “hot” goal representation areas in v/mPFC are
phylogenetically older and also tend to be motivationally dominant over the ”colder” processing carried out
in lateral PFC areas.
Active goal maintenance in v/mPFC: The fact that the ACC and OFC share the same robust mecha-
nisms for active maintenance and adaptive gating so important for lateral frontal areas, combined with their
relatively privileged access to other “limbic” areas, makes them particularly powerful components of the
goal processing system. Thus, active maintenance can sustain a goal representation for the duration of its
engagement. Furthermore, LV-related goal-attainment probability tracking could be supported by a special-
ized activation-based temporal integration process in the ACC and/or OFC areas. With incremental updating
of new information into existing active representations, graded overall values such as the running average
rate of reward or effort can be computed. We describe preliminary models of our temporal integration ap-
proach below. Particularly important, we believe, will be the temporal derivatives of these running averages,
which could provide both phasic and tonic signals, e.g., whether you are in your zone of proximal devel-
opment, or not — too much success can often be boring, while too little tends to be frustrating (Vygotsky,
1978Carver & Scheier, 1990).
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Goal selection dynamics: Many potential factors shape the goal selection process, including internal
state of the organism (e.g., level of hunger, thirst, energy), the state of the environment (opportunities and
threats), existing goal state representations (higher-order goals, overall priorities, future deadlines, and other
latent goal-like representations), and recent history of experience (which can serve to both activate and in-
hibit recently-activated goals — you could want to repeat a recent positive experience, or become bored
with something and seek to explore new options). All of these factors interact with learned utility represen-
tations to select and engage goals to be actively pursued for the immediate time horizon. Computationally,
our models of this process build upon existing work that captures fundamental aspects of simultaneous
bottom-up and top-down constraint satisfaction (O’Reilly, Wyatte, Herd, Mingus, & Jilk, 2013O’Reilly &
Munakata, 2000O’Reilly, Munakata, Frank, Hazy, & Contributors, 2012), along with fundamental aspects
of higher-level executive function such as the ability to flexibly recombine existing representations to solve
novel problems (O’Reilly, 2001Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, & O’Reilly, 2005Kriete, Noelle, Cohen, &
O’Reilly, 2013).
Action selection under an engaged goal: Once a particular goal state has been actively engaged in
a single-minded way, the job at hand becomes how best to proceed so as to achieve that goal through
some set of often sequential actions. This can be variously straightforward or quite challenging (see Pez-
zulo & Castelfranchi, 2009 for an extensive discussion). In the straightforward case, there may already be
a previously-learned set of instrumental sub-goal states and related action plans that, with input from the
engaged overarching goal (including its perceptual associations) and the bottom-up perceptual input, results
in a basal-ganglia mediated selection of the action most likely to move you closest to achieving that goal.
Critically, as that plan is carried out and instrumental sub-goals achieved, progress toward the goal can drive
phasic dopamine bursts (via the LV, or learned value component of PVLV) that reinforce the activation (and
pursuit) of those sub-goals for next time in similar circumstances (with appropriate abstract generalization
built in by virtue of a parietal cortex that encodes actions in appropriately abstract and systematic ways that
includes anticipated sensory outcomes). Overall, the goal-first paradigm motivates the use of perceptual and
motor representations that operate at a sufficient level of abstraction and compositionality that they can be
flexibly recombined to produce novel action plans, formulated in advance through consideration of the cur-
rent situation (Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 2009Rizzolati, Camarda, Fogassi, Gentilucci, Luppino, & Matelli,
1988). For example, the use of visual indexes may be one important part of this (Pylyshyn, 2000). Next, we
present a computational model that embodies our principles, within the context of basic rat foraging behav-
ior. After describing this model, we elaborate on some of the core components of the overall framework,
followed by a discussion of some outstanding issues and broader application of the framework to a number
of different domains.
Computational Model of Rat Foraging Behavior
To provide a comprehensive platform for current and future investigation of goal-driven behavior, we
developed a relatively large-scale model that includes the ability to interact directly with a (virtual) environ-
ment through camera-level visual inputs, along with the full set of brain areas that we think are relevant for
goal selection and goal-driven behavior in the goal engaged state (Figure 3; see Appendix for full details).
We call the simulated rat in this model “emery”, in reference to the emergent simulator we use to model
it (http://grey.colorado.edu/emergent). Our initial tests presented here involve a simple plus
maze environment, with four different locations (each of which is marked with a distinctive visual land-
mark) where primary value (PV) outcomes can be obtained. The red landmark signals a location where
meat pellets can be obtained, which satisfy emery’s need for protein; blue signals water, satisfying thirst;
yellow signals a sugar pellet, satisfying a need for calories; and green signals vegetables, satisfying a need
for vitamins. Each location can also have negative outcomes, such as an 80% chance of experiencing bitter-
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Figure 3: The rat (named “emery”) foraging model and its plus-maze like environment, with four different possible
primary value (PV) locations (red = meat, blue = water, yellow = sugar, green = veggies). In addition to these positive
PV outcomes, each location can also have negative outcomes: e.g., veggies can be bitter, and meat can be rotten.
For each run, emery experiences 2 states of negative body state depravation (e.g., thirst and need for vitamins from
veggies), which drive goal selection. Emery processes a bitmap first-person camera view into the environment, to
extract an invariant IT Object representation. Motor control learns to re-orient until this Object representation matches
the Target, and then it approaches. The ACC ActPlans units specify the 4 different targets to approach, coordinating
the OFC PosLV representations that learn the specific Target features associated with different PV outcomes, with
the specific dlPFC motor plan required (just approach target in this case). The NegLV OFC representation encodes
negative outcomes associated with different targets, and helps constrain the overall ACC action plan selection. Once
a target goal is selected, then those OFC and ACC states are gated in (via simulated Ventral Striatum (VS) gating),
and maintained during the goal engaged period. These top-down signals bias LV signaling via CeM and BLA to drive
phasic dopamine in the VTA, which reflects increases in proximity to the desired PV outcome.
ness associated with eating the veggies; a 70% chance of the sugar pellet also having a sour taste; and 50%
chances of the meat pellet either having a sulferous or rotten taste. These negative outcomes are intended
to be simple proxies for all manner of possible negative costs associated with a given goal choice, such as
increased effort, possibility of physical harm, etc. The overall testing scenario is for emery to explore this
environment, and learn to make choices in response to states of multiple depravation (e.g., need for vitamins
and thirst) that optimize the cost-benefit tradeoff or utility.
After an initial brief period of purely random exploration, which enables the development of initial as-
sociations between different visual landmarks and PV outcomes (in various brain areas, including the CeM,
BLA, and OFC), we begin a more systematic test of goal selection, which is then followed immediately by
goal-engaged pursuit of the selected target outcome. For example, if the negative body state of the model
(which is intended to reflect basic brainstem level, likely hypothalamic, mechanisms) is driven by lack of
vitamins and water (thirst), then these projections will activate corresponding positive outcome representa-
tions in the OFC (PosLV layer), which represent the PV’s that satisfy these needs (e.g., veggies and water in
this case). These OFC representations (single localist neurons in this simplified model) have learned inter-
connections with corresponding ACC action plan value representations, encoding essentially the net utility
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Figure 4: Activation dynamics in the OFC and ACC during the goal selection constraint satisfaction settling process,
for choosing between veggies and water. Initially, the OFC positive LV (LV+) representations are activated by the
bottom-up negative body state drivers (thirst and need for vitamins), and this spreads to the corresponding ACC action
plan value representations. Once the ACC plan to approach green is activated, it drives the associated negative outcome
in OFC LV- layer: bitterness (which is a proxy for all the other possible negative outcomes). This negative value then
feeds back inhibition to the corresponding ACC action plan, leading to its sharp decrease in overall comparative utility
relative to the approach water plan, which has no such negative association. Because neurons in each of these layers
are competing with each other, even small overall differences can be magnified, to drive selection of the best overall
option. Once this process settles sufficiently, the winning patterns are gated into a robust active maintenance state,
resulting in the transition to the goal engaged state.
associated with approaching the associated landmark (with the action plan itself encoded in the dlPFC layer
that the ACC interconnects with). This utility is also shaped by interconnections with the OFC negative
outcome neurons (NegLV layer, which may correspond more accurately with the sub-genual ACC, area 25,
as discussed later), which has also learned through exploration about the negative outcomes associated with
these different actions. Thus, the ACC action plan representations serve to coordinate multiple different
OFC value representations, organized according to the relevant outcomes associated with different actions.
Critically, the negative outcomes have a net negative impact on the associated ACC representations, which
enables them to reflect a net overall utility (positive excitation from PosLV minus inhibition from NegLV).
Overall, the resulting dynamic is one of multiple constraint satisfaction among all the different value
representations, and actions being considered (Figure 4). Constraint satisfaction relies on bidirectional ex-
citatory and inhibitory dynamics, and is a fundamental dynamic of cortical processing (O’Reilly et al.,
2013O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000O’Reilly et al., 2012). The role of frontal areas using constraint satisfac-
tion processing to select among options has been explored in related computational and empirical work
(Snyder, Hutchison, Nyhus, Curran, Banich, & Munakata, 2010Snyder, Banich, & Munakata, 2011). This
process may result in a paring down of options to a few contenders that satisfy the most constraints.
As shown in the Figure, the constraint satisfaction dynamic between veggies and water is strongly in-
fluenced by the negative outcome of bitterness associated with the veggie action plan — this serves as the
decisive tie breaker between two otherwise roughly equally positive outcomes. In general, competitive
dynamics within the ACC and OFC layers can help drive selection of the highest utility option. But this
dynamic is also highly sensitive to the nature of the alternatives being considered — this strong dependence
of decisions on the set of alternatives is well studied in the decision making literature (e.g., Simonson &
Tversky, 1992), and more elaborated versions of this model could potentially be used to account for detailed
data in that domain. In any case, once the constraint satisfaction process settles out, the winning pattern of
activation across the OFC, ACC, and dlPFC layers constitutes the selected goal representation, and it should
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then be gated in by the ventral striatum (VS) direct pathway neurons, that should then engage robust active
maintenance in these areas (O’Reilly & Frank, 2006Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2006Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly,
2007). In the current model, we simplify by just programmatically engaging a form of robust active main-
tenance in these layers, but future versions will explore the dopamine-mediated learning dynamics that may
govern this gating process, as detailed in our PBWM (prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia working memory)
models (O’Reilly & Frank, 2006Hazy et al., 2006Hazy et al., 2007).
Once the selected goal becomes engaged, it has several important impacts on subsequent behavior, in-
cluding driving appropriate motor actions to achieve the goal, and biasing phasic dopamine signals to reflect
increments in progress toward this goal. The motor action system incorporates a basic but powerful form of
sensory-driven motor control, where the overall action plan is “approach a target”, with the specific target
being specified in another pathway. This critically allows the very same motor program to automatically
generalize to a very wide range of possible situations, which is of central importance when considering the
needs of goal-driven action. In particular, you need to be able to specify the action plan in advance of under-
taking a given goal, so that you can properly evaluate the cost/benefit tradeoffs associated with that action
plan. Thus, these action plans must exist already, and having a small set of highly generalizable such plans
provides an efficient solution to this problem (Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 2009Rizzolati et al., 1988Pylyshyn,
2000). In our model, the specific target that you want to approach for a given goal is learned during the
random exploration period, in the LV (learned value) portions of the network (from the CeM to the BLA and
OFC). Thus, the PosLV OFC representations for “liquid” are now capable of activating the corresponding
sensory target representation for the blue landmark that was associated with the liquid PV outcome during
initial exploration.
The dlPFC approach plan uses inputs from the LV target representation, together with bottom-up pro-
cessing of the current visual input, which extracts a spatially-invariant object representation, to determine
whether the object matches the target (in which case the rat should move forward) or alternatively that it
should look around more until it does find a match to the target. We implemented a scaled-down, simplified
version of our recently-published object recognition system to produce this invariant Object representa-
tion, going through a primary (V1) and secondary (V4) visual processing pathway (O’Reilly et al., 2013)
(see Appendix for more details). We also trained an explicit Match representation to compute whether the
bottom-up stimulus Object layer matched the Target layer — this could presumably be learned in the course
of developing this generalized motor program, but we wanted to ensure that this information was readily
available to drive more robust performance without too much additional training. Both the visual object
recognition and the approach target motor plan were trained in advance of the specific goal selection task,
reflecting background developmental learning processes.
Thus, a typical run involves emery making a sequence of rotations (scanning behavior) until the target
landmark associated with the selected goal comes into view, followed by a sequence of forward approach
steps until the PV delivery location is reached, directly in front of the visible landmark. During this approach
process, the increasing proximity to the learned PV outcome location drives learned LV associations in the
CeM (and BLA) from both the visual pathway (particularly the intermediate V4 level, which has some de-
gree of feature abstraction, but retains also significant view specificity), and a simple proxy for hippocampal
place-cell representations in the HippoRatPos layer. These increasing CeM LV values then drive phasic
dopamine firing in the VTA, in proportion to the local gradient (temporal derivative) (Figure 5). This phasic
dopamine signal is then available to train the specific motor actions that lead to increased proximity to the
desired goal — this training ultimately results in the formation of sensory-motor habits that can optimize
well-learned goal approach behaviors. More details on this gdPVLV phasic dopamine firing are provided in
a subsequent section.
Once the primary value outcome is achieved, it drives learning in all of the relevant areas, from CeM
to BLA to OFC — these areas all learn to link the sensory cues and other internal representations that
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Figure 5: Phasic dopamine (in the VTA) driven by progressive approach toward the learned PV location associated
with liquid water outcomes, as reflected in increasing CeM activation. The LHb / RMTg activity reflects learned
anticipation of PV outcomes as a result of projections from the ventral striatum (PVi), the latter also serving to directly
shunt phasic DA bursting that would otherwise occur at the time of PV outcome receipt.
are currently active with the corresponding PV values that were experienced (this is why we refer to these
representations as LV or learned value representations, even though they also receive a strong primary drive
from PV inputs). This PV receipt also results in the satiation of the associated body state signal(s), and
potentially the destabilization of the existing OFC, ACC, and dlPFC goal representations, if the degree of
PV experience was sufficiently satisfying. In the model, we simply assume that each PV outcome experience
is sufficiently satisfying, and we start the process over again with a new random set of negative body state
representations, which then drive a new round of goal selection, to satisfy those needs. All the while, the
model continues to strengthen its knowledge about expected PV outcomes, and sensory stimuli associated
therewith, so that the goal selection process can be more well-informed and accurate.
In summary, this model demonstrates the functioning of the core mechanisms hypothesized in this paper,
in the context of an embodied sensory-motor system that can enable many different behavioral scenarios to
be examined, in a realistic manner. Much work remains to be done to explore specific behavioral paradigms
and associated neural recording and other relevant neural data that can constrain and inform this model.
Here, we address a few specific examples, but a whole research program is required to more fully test the
novel predictions of this overall framework. We outline some of these predictions in the discussion section
as well.
Testable Predictions of the Model
As explicated in the remainder of the paper, our model makes contact with a very broad range of data, at
many different levels of analysis, from detailed neuroscience up to salient features of daily human life. How-
ever, there are a few specific predictions that our model makes that are particularly useful for highlighting
some of its relatively unique properties, which we discuss here.
Ventral Striatum (VS) activity should be concentrated at the start and end of tasks, whereas Dorsal
Striatum (DS) tracks online action selection during task performance more directly. This prediction is
based on the fact that VS provides the discrete working memory updating signals for the goal maintenance
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areas in the OFC and ACC, and this should occur at the transition from goal selection to goal engagement
(to lock in the selected goal representations), and then again to deactivate goals upon goal achievement,
and enable a new round of goal selection. In contrast, dorsal areas of the striatum are involved in selecting
more specific online action plans as a task unfolds under a given overall goal plan. Data across two studies
using the same T maze paradigm nicely confirms this key prediction. Atallah, McCool, Howe, and Graybiel
(2014) recently found that principal neurons in the VS fire phasically at the very start of the maze, and
gradually ramp up firing near the end. In contrast, DS neurons fire at various points during the running of
the maze, in particular at the choice point (Thorn, Atallah, Howe, & Graybiel, 2010). Note that these striatal
data are more diagnostic than direct recordings of OFC and ACC, which are likely to exhibit ongoing and
updated firing throughout the task.
Integrating reward and cost values (e.g., effort, delay, or risk) depends on the ACC and its inter-
connectivity with the BLA and VS. In our model, the ACC provides the nexus for integrating the different
value representations encoded elsewhere, to represent an overall utility reflecting rewards and other posi-
tive outcomes weighed against costs and other negative outcomes. This is consistent with several lines of
data. For example, integrity of the ACC appears particularly crucial for choosing effortful options, as ACC
lesions compromise the ability to choose rewards with high effort costs (Walton, Bannerman, Alterescu, &
Rushworth, 2003Rudebeck, Walton, Smyth, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2006).
Dopamine depletion also reduces effortful choices, and rats with lesions of the BLA or NAc also show
reduced preferences to choose high reward options paired with effort costs over low reward, less effortful
options (Salamone, Cousins, & Snyder, 1997Floresco, St Onge, Ghods-Sharifi, & Winstanley, 2008). Le-
sioning the connection between BLA and ACC leads to similar difficulties with choosing the high reward
arm paired with high effort (Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi, 2007Floresco et al., 2008). In the domain of risky
decision making, lesioning the top-down connection from ACC to BLA caused increased probability of
choosing a large but risky option, and reduced ability to shift choices after omissions, supporting the idea
that the ACC is crucial for integrating and updating this risk-based value information (St Onge, Stopper,
Zahm, & Floresco, 2012). Similarly, ACC lesions impaired decision making on a dynamic foraging task
that involved flexible integration of risk and reward information (Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, &
Rushworth, 2006). In addition, electrophysiological data shows that neurons in the ACC flexibly integrate
multiple decision-making attributes, such as reward, risk and effort into a common choice value that is used
to guide decisions (Steven, Timothy, & Jonathan, 2011Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, & Wallis, 2009).
OFC-mediated goal progress signals are important for sustaining goal engagement in the absence
of other cues, whereas explicit sensory cues can suffice without an OFC. We hypothesize that the OFC
represents the highest level of the LV goal-progress tracking system, which is uniquely capable of using
active maintenance to sustain estimates of progress even in the absence of external sensory inputs. Consis-
tent with this prediction, OFC lesions lead to increased impulsive choices in some tasks (Rudebeck et al.,
2006Mobini, Body, Ho, Bradshaw, Szabadi, Deakin, & Anderson, 2002), but other studies found decreased
impulsive choices with OFC lesions (Zeeb, Floresco, & Winstanley, 2010Winstanley, Theobald, Cardinal, &
Robbins, 2004). Critically, these studies differed in the presence of stimuli that could have acted as cues to
ongoing progress toward the goal (Floresco et al., 2008Zeeb et al., 2010) — the OFC was only important
when these cues were absent.
OFC is important for outcome-based action selection, e.g., in outcome devaluation and related
paradigms. This prediction is well established (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall, &
Everitt, 2002Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2006Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007Pauli, Clark, Guen-
ther, O’Reilly, & Rudy, 2012a), and consistent with multiple models, so we only raise it to flag that this
literature could provide a rich dataset for more detailed modeling in future work. The standard finding is
that an intact OFC (and associated ventral striatum) is important for an animal to overcome habitual re-
sponses that result in delivery of food or other outcomes that are no longer rewarding (e.g., due to an added
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unpleasant bitter flavor). In our framework, a hungry animal selects an active goal based on available in-
formation, and the constraint satisfaction process in OFC and other areas is critical for choosing a goal that
integrates all the current available information. Thus, in the absence of the OFC, the fact that the food is
now aversive cannot be integrated into the goal selection process, and more primitive lower-level systems
drive behavior toward the default outcomes given the state (i.e., when hungry, seek food). Furthermore,
even more basic habitual associations between stimuli and responses, encoded in dorsolateral striatum and
SMA-level motor control areas, can drive behavior even in the absence of any engaged goal at all. One
interesting question we plan to explore is the extent to which goal-driven behavior can be sustained in the
absence of the OFC in mammals, e.g., relying on the BLA and CeM, or if everything truly is purely habitual,
as is characterized in the existing literature.
Value function dissociations between goal selection and goal engaged modes. The most important
broader predictions from our model, for which we are not aware of direct empirical tests, are about the
dissociations in value functions between the goal selection (conservative weighing of costs and benefits)
versus goal engaged (dominated by progress toward enaged goal) states. One possible reflection of this
dissociation comes from data on monkeys performing tasks that required 1, 2 or 3 steps of a mildly effortful
task prior to obtaining a reward (Liu & Richmond, 2000). They found that the monkeys starting step 2 of
the 3-step task were much more accurate and faster than monkeys starting step 1 of the 2-step task. This
is despite the fact that both of these cases are equally distant from the subsequent reward outcome. We
could interpret the difference as being due to the extra conservative value function at the point of starting
the two step task, compared to the goal-engaged momentum from already being engaged in the three-step
task. Although this data is potentially encouraging, we plan to develop more comprehensive experimental
paradigms to more conclusively test this prediction in the future.
In the next section, we explicate in more detail the gdPVLV component of the model, followed by a
broad outline of data relevant to the larger-scale map of goal-relevant representations throughout the brain,
up through the v/mPFC areas (including OFC and ACC).
Goal-Driven Primary Value, Learned Value (gdPVLV)
Over the past decade, we have been developing a computational model of the biology of phasic dopamine
responses to primary rewards (unconditioned stimuli, USes) and conditioned stimuli (CSes), called PVLV
(primary value, learned value) (O’Reilly et al., 2007Hazy et al., 2010). This model is based on the clas-
sic Rescorla-Wagner model (RW; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), extended to address the inability of the RW
model to deal with phasic dopamine responses to CSes. The widely-cited temporal differences (TD) model
(Hollerman & Schultz, 1998Montague et al., 1996Schultz et al., 1997Schultz, 1998Schultz & Dickinson,
2000Sutton, 1988Sutton & Barto, 1990Sutton & Barto, 1998Waelti et al., 2001) addressed this problem
through a backward chaining process where each step in time attempts to predict the reward prediction at
the next step. However, this chaining process is inherently unreliable in real world situations (O’Reilly
et al., 2007) and does not connect very directly with the known biology. The PVLV model instead adopts
an associative learning mechanism (the LV mechanism) to account for the CS-triggered firing, within an es-
sentially RW paradigm. This model assigns empirically-supported computational roles for a variety of brain
areas, including the medial segment of the central nucleus of the amygdala (CeM), the ventral striatum (VS;
principally the Nucleus Accumbens, NAc), the lateral hypothalamic area (LH), and the principle dopamine
cell-containing areas the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia nigra, pars compacta (SNc).
Here, we outline a reframing of the PVLV algorithm from the goals-first point-of-view, which retains
all of the major features and explanatory power of the original model, while providing a broader interpre-
tation of its essential computational features (captured succinctly in Figure 1). For clarity, we call this new
goal-driven framework gdPVLV. Instead of confining the framing to the rather limited stimulus-then-reward
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Figure 6: LV (learned value) system in the medial central nucleus of the amygdala (CeM) associates stimuli with
primary values (PV) driven by learning at the time of PV activation, signaled by bottom-up drive from nuclei such as
the lateral hypothalamus (LH) for positive-valenced PVs (e.g., food, water). The LV system drives phasic bursts or
dips in the dopamine nuclei (VTA & SNc) according to the temporal derivative (difference) in LV activation over time.
Pavlovian paradigm, we now adopt the much broader — and more ecologically valid — paradigm of for-
aging, as illustrated in our model. Here, landmarks become the ecological versions of conditioned stimuli
(CSes), which thus assume the role of driving the LV system in PVLV. Natural landmarks provide a reliable
source of graded perceptual cues for how far the organism is away from its current goal (e.g., finding food
if it is hungry). Going berry picking in a reasonably large and variably berried terrain clearly fits in the cat-
egory of addictive incremental reward tasks, and could plausibly be the evolutionary prototype for all that
follows this template. The rich literature on foraging strategies in different animals and situations should
provide many additional insights into the nature of the goal-driven learning system (e.g., Kamil & Roitblat,
1985Pyke, 1984Menzel & Giurfa, 2001). Also, this “directional” aspect of dopaminergic function is con-
sistent with the framework of Salamone and Correa (2012), and the notion that the mesolimbic dopamine
system and other limbic areas coordinate approach towards rewarding stimuli (Ikemoto, 2010).
We start by reformulating the learned value (LV) aspect in PVLV as providing estimates of the probability
of specific goal (PV) achievement, through learned connections with perceptual inputs. Then, we describe
the different mechanisms involved in learning from and processing primary values (PVs). Overall, the core
new insight incorporated into the gdPVLV framework is that a goal-driven system needs to perform two dis-
tinct types of computations. The LV computation provides a prospective or anticipatory monitoring capacity
to estimate how close you are getting to a given goal. It is strictly an estimate, based on the best available
data, but it cannot substitute for actual goal attainment — it is fallible, but better than nothing, and can help
drive action learning and provide feedback about whether it seems reasonable to continue pursuing the goal
or not. In contrast, the PV system represents real concrete outcomes that unequivocally indicate progress
toward a goal, including the state of achieving a given goal (which engages goal deactivation mechanisms).
The PV system anchors everything that is learned for computing LV values, and there are mechanisms that
provide more specific estimates of PV values, so that discrepancies can be detected (including the critical
case of detecting when an expected PV fails to materialize at all).
Learned Values (LV) for Graded Goal Probability Estimation
The core equation for the LV aspect of gdPVLV directly codifies the notion that dopamine bursts and
dips (though the latter actually involves additional, separate neural mechanisms as described below) signal
changes to an accumulating, perceptually-driven estimate for the probability of goal achievement:
δlv =
∑
g
g(t) (LVg(t)− LVg(t− 1)) (1)
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where LVg can be interpreted as a learned current-best estimate of the probability that specific goal g will
occur within the immediate time horizon (and modulated by current goal activation level g(t), which reflects
top-down activation from goal maintenance areas modulating responsiveness of the dopamine system). LVg
is not strictly a properly normalized probability however — it just needs to provide graded values that have
a maximum at time of actual goal satisfaction, and a minimum presumably at a distance infinitely far away
from the goal. Biologically, the phasic dopamine signal has been shown to be normalized and rescaled in
order to optimize its dynamic range (Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005) — and this normalization is reflected
in the LV-associated dopamine signals as well. The important thing is thatLVg have a reasonable, monotonic
relationship to goal proximity. Theoretically, there can be multiple different goals operating at once and so
Equation (1) is a summation. Each separate goal can have its own complicated metric space that calculates
separate LVg values. Nonetheless, changes to each LVg ultimately get boiled down to a common currency
at the level of phasic changes in dopamine firing levels, represented by the δlv value.
The delta function (a discretized temporal derivative) is evaluated at two different points in time: the
current time t relative to a previous time interval (with a behaviorally relevant time scale presumably in the
100’s of millisecond range). Relative to the original PVLV formulation, this LVg value is equivalent to the
LVe value (e = excitatory) — in the interest of avoiding subscript overload we drop the e = excitatory / i =
inhibitory terminology in this discussion, although the fundamental juxtaposition of competing excitatory
and inhibitory drivers for both PV and LV still prevails and is a useful way to think about what is actually
going on.
Biologically, at the lowest level of the goal pyramid, we map the appetitive LVg function to the activation
of glutamatergic neurons in the medial segment of the central nucleus of the amygdala (CeM) that respond
natively to appetitive primary rewards such as food (e.g., Fukuda & Ono, 1993Lee, Gallagher, & Holland,
2010Knapska, Walasek, Nikolaev, Neuhusser-Wespy, Lipp, Kaczmarek, & Werka, 2006Ono, Nishijo, &
Uwano, 1995Ono, Tamura, Nishijo, Nakamura, & Tabuchi, 1989), and through learning come to fire in re-
sponse to conditioned stimuli (CSs) that come to be associated with those PVs (unconditioned stimuli; USs;
Ono et al., 1995). CeM neurons have been shown to have direct excitatory projections onto the dopamine
cells of both VTA and SNc and, even more densely, to the pedunculopontine tegmental (PPTg) nucleus
which itself projects strongly to both VTA and SNc (Fudge & Haber, 2000Wallace, Magnuson, & Gray,
1992Takayama & Miura, 1991). The PPTg is a complex and heterogeneous structure, still poorly under-
stood, but has been shown to be a potent driver of phasic dopamine cell bursting (Floresco, West, Ash,
Moore, & Grace, 2003Grace & Bunney, 1984Lodge & Grace, 2006aPan & Hyland, 2005). Available data
is consistent with the idea that a highly-tuned dynamical interaction within a subnetwork that includes the
CeM, the PPTg, the lateral dorsal tegmental (LDTg) nucleus (Lodge & Grace, 2006b) and the dopamine
cells themselves is responsible for enabling a pattern of bursting that acts like a positive-rectified temporal
derivative of LVg. There are also direct excitatory projections from lateral hypothalamus (LH) to the CeM
(e.g., Amaral, Veazey, & Cowan, 1982Ottersen, 1980), and to the VTA/SNc both directly (Phillipson, 1978),
and indirectly via the PPTg (Semba & Fibiger, 1992). Thus, as a source of PV signals occurring at the time
of the US, LH afferents provide a local training signal for CeM neurons to pair CSs with the USs they predict
(Hazy et al., 2010Ono et al., 1995). Figure 6 summarizes the key components of the appetitive LV system
as currently proposed.
The overall model for LV (CeM) learning is that it is driven by the conjunction of a newly arriving PV
(unconditioned stimulus; US) signal (probably from the LH), along with the phasic dopamine burst triggered
by the US. Critically, in the absence of this specific conjunctive PV learning signal, the LV neurons cannot
learn and just continue to report a graded sensory response in proportion to how close the current perceptual
inputs are to those stimuli present during prior learning situations when the PV input was active. A simple
mathematical equation expresses this learning rule:
∆wig = g  δpv (PV g − LV g)xi iff PV g > 0 (2)
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where xi is a sensory input to the LV unit, g is goal activation,  is a learning rate, δpv is the phasic dopamine
signal driven at the time of the PV (see below). PVg is an actual PV outcome received (or some transform
thereof to increase dynamic range), and the iff (if and only if) statement constrains learning to when the
primary value is actually present (all values assumed to be at the present time, so time dependence is assumed
but not notated to keep things simpler). This PV constraint provides grounding for LV firing so that it must
be continually “validated” by real primary values, and cannot take on a life of its own.
The contribution of phasic dopamine at the time of the PV in this equation (δpv) is important for two
functional reasons, and is consistent with the fact that both the CeM and BLA are richly innervated by
dopamine fibers from the VTA (Fallon & Ciofi, 1992Amaral, Price, Pitkanen, & Carmichael, 1992). First,
it is necessary to account for the blocking effect (Kamin, 1969aKamin, 1969b) and conditioned inhibition
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; see Waelti et al., 2001 and Tobler, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2003, respectively for
a full theoretical discussion). For example, in the blocking effect, an existing learned association predicts
the occurrence of the PV, so that the phasic dopamine signal is zero, preventing new learning of a newly
introduced stimulus that redundantly predicts the PV. Second, this term, when negative, enables the weak-
ening of afferent LVg synaptic weights when they ought to go down as, for example, when an expected PV
later comes to reliably fail to materialize due to changed contingencies, generating phasic dopamine dips.
As discussed at length in earlier PVLV papers (Hazy et al., 2010O’Reilly et al., 2007), an important
implication of the LV learning equation is that phasic dopamine bursts, once acquired by the LV system
(equation 1), must not be allowed to feed back upon themselves and drive further weight strengthening to
the LV itself. If it did, this would give rise to a runaway positive feedback loop not grounded in actual PV
values. Instead, LV-generated dopamine signals can only be allowed to train other contingencies as, for
example, learning to initiate actions in response to CS signals that increase the chances of receiving reward.
Mathematically, the LV phasic dopamine equation (1) is essentially the simple Y-dot (temporal deriva-
tive) formulation explored by Sutton and Barto prior to their developing the full TD algorithm (Sutton &
Barto, 1981Sutton & Barto, 1990). The Y-dot formulation was adopted by us in the second version of our
PVLV algorithm (Hazy et al., 2010) as somewhat of a technical convenience since we had not yet fully
worked out a mechanism for phasic dopamine bursting. Furthermore, we had not yet fully appreciated the
powerful significance of this formulation, which the new goal-centric framework and the foraging paradigm
serve to highlight. Importantly, unlike Sutton & Barto’s original Y-dot formula as well as their subsequent
TD algorithm, both of which propose a single mechanism covering all aspects of reward learning, we em-
phasize that there are important and distinct computational functions not performed by the LV side of PVLV
system, resulting in the need for additional mechanisms on the PV side of the system.
In particular, the LV equation alone cannot handle the problem of knowing when an expected PV (goal
achievement) has not occurred. It is essential that the LV signal be driven by perceptual inputs in advance
of any receipt of the PV, but the consequence of this is that the absence of a PV cannot inhibit LV firing.
Instead, a separate system must drive an active signal for the absence of an expected PV — this is the job of
the PV side of the PVLV system, which learns to detect all manner of deviations in the timing, magnitude
and probability of PVs relative to expectations — these deviations from expectation can be important clues
about changes in the environment or performance that can affect the goal and action systems. It is well
established that the dopamine response at the time of the US (PV) is indeed sensitive to these kinds of
deviations from expectations (e.g., Schultz, 1998Schultz, 2002Tobler et al., 2005).
Detecting Primary Value Discrepancies
At a purely abstract level, the core PV dopamine driving equation can be thought of as a Rescorla-Wagner
comparison between expected and obtained primary values:
δpv =
∑
g
g
(
PVg − P̂ V g
)
(3)
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Figure 7: Neural pathways involved in the PV system, comparing the actual received PV signal with the estimate P̂ V .
The ability of the LHb (lateral habenula) to drive dips in dopamine firing can compute [PV + − P̂ V +]−: a positive
outcome that doesn’t live up to the expectation or is missing altogether. The direct inhibitory projections from VS
to the dopamine areas, compared with direct drive from PV +, can account for [PV + − P̂ V +]+: a dopamine burst
to the extent that the expectation is below the actual positive outcome value (and a cancellation when the expectation
matches).
where P̂ V g represents an estimate of the PV value expected for every timestep, and the net delta value
reflects any discrepancy between the actual and estimated PV s (all values assumed to be at the current time
point), driving phasic changes in dopamine firing.
As in the LV, a simple mathematical expression captures the basic learning rule for the weights coming
into the P̂ V g representation:
∆wig = g
(
PV g − P̂ V g
)
xi (4)
which differs from the LV learning equation in lacking the “iff” conditional that restricts LV learning to
only those times when the PV is present. (It also lacks a dopamine term.) Thus, P̂ V g representations are
constantly learning about the relative presence or absence of PV inputs for each timestep and so enable very
precise expectations regarding the timing, probability, and magnitude of individual PVs. This learning is
based on a wide range of sensory inputs that support the ability to generate these expectations (represented
by the xi inputs in the above equation). Comparing the LV and PV learning equations further, it is clear that
there are different demands for each form of learning and that neither can be subsumed by the other. Relative
to previous PVLV versions which used versions of the RW framework for both LV and PV, contrasting the
new goal-driven LV equation as a pure Y-dot calculation against the standard RW formulation used in the
PV equation makes the distinction particularly clear and compelling.
Biologically, we map the P̂ V g representations to neurons in the striosomal compartment of the ventral
striatum (VS), particularly those of the nucleus accumbens (NAc; Figure 7). Because the ventral stria-
tum preferentially receives afferents from all “limbic” areas, importantly including a dense projection from
the basolateral amygdala (BLA; e.g., Charara & Grace, 2003Crittenden & Graybiel, 2011Floresco, 2007Flo-
resco, Blaha, Yang, & Phillips, 2001Howland, Taepavarapruk, & Phillips, 2002), it is clearly well positioned
for acquiring P̂ V g representations. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that the brain uses these rep-
resentations in two distinct ways (involving partially separate pathways) for dealing with discrepancies in
the positive vs. negative direction (Figure 7). This is a consequence of the fact that phasic dopamine cell
bursting and constant, low-frequency ( 3-5 Hz) tonic firing are under the control of largely separate affer-
ent systems (Grace & Bunney, 1984Floresco et al., 2003). As a result, the prevention of bursts and the
generation of dips each depend upon largely separate mechanisms as well, as we summarize here:
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• Shunting Bursts: Striosomal neurons of the VS make direct, monosynaptic GABA-ergic contacts
onto dopamine neurons across all of the VTA and SNc (Gerfen, 1985Gerfen, Herkenham, & Thibault,
1987Joel & Weiner, 2000Smith & Bolam, 1990). Thus, the (anticipatory) activation of these neurons
can directly shunt excitatory inputs produced by PV occurrence, and once P̂ V g representations are
fully learned they will prevent any burst-firing that would otherwise occur. Any PV magnitude greater
than that currently coded in a P̂ V g representation can still produce a partial bursting signal that reflects
the amount of upside surprise. However, these shunting GABA-ergic inputs can not produce overt
pauses in tonic firing.
• Driving Dips: P̂ V g representations in the VS can also support the detection of expectation viola-
tions and enable the triggering of dopamine dips. The biological machinery for this leverages the
neural pathways by which negatively valenced outcomes such as pain can directly produce pauses
in dopamine firing. P̂ V g VS neurons send projections via the pallidum (probably collaterals of the
burst-preventing projections just-described, but not necessarily) that drive the lateral habenula (LHb)
with expectations about the magnitude and precise timing of PVs (Hong & Hikosaka, 2008Ji & Shep-
ard, 2007Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2007). Via a separate pathway, hypothesized by us to also involve
the VS and pallidum (Apicella, Ljungberg, Scarnati, & Schultz, 1991Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto,
Hong, & Hikosaka, 2010Hong & Hikosaka, 2008), the LHb is also driven by the PV itself. If the ex-
pected PV fails to occur, or is weaker than anticipated, the uncancelled remainder of the P̂ V g signal
increases LHb firing, triggering dopamine dips via a projection to the rostromedial tegmental nucleus
(RMTg) (also known as the tail of the VTA) (Bourdy & Barrot, 2012Hong, Jhou, Smith, Saleem, &
Hikosaka, 2011Jhou, Fields, Baxter, Saper, & Holland, 2009).
Negative Primary Values
Because the goal-driven framework stipulates that proper goals are fundamentally appetitive in nature,
we do not need to be directly concerned here with the complexities of what happens to the dopamine sys-
tem for negatively-valenced outcomes, such as pain. As summarized in Figure 2 and elaborated below,
negatively valenced affective states can serve to motivate the selection of appropriate goals to overcome
these negative states, but it makes no sense to say that negative-outcome states can represent a desired
outcome of any active goal — indeed, they act rather as “anti-goals” in this case. It is known that neg-
ative outcomes (e.g., pain onset, or an aversive air puff to the eye) can reliably drive dopamine dips (at
least for most dopamine cells) through direct activation of the RMTg and/or the LHb as described above
(Ji & Shepard, 2007Lecourtier, DeFrancesco, & Moghaddam, 2008Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2007Shepard,
Holcomb, & Gold, 2006Stamatakis & Stuber, 2012Lammel, Lim, Ran, Huang, Betley, Tye, Deisseroth, &
Malenka, 2012). These dips can contribute to avoidance learning as, for example, to avoid movements or
actions that result in pain outcomes. Furthermore, integrated experiences of pain and other aversive states
should logically be accumulated over the course of action and goal engagement, so that those kinds of cost
factors can be factored into subsequent goal and action selection in the future.
It is well documented that negative outcomes drive various activation and arousal mechanisms, including
the recent discovery of a small sub-population of previously unrecognized dopamine cells in medial pos-
terior VTA that receive direct glutamatergic input from the LHb and respond to noxious stimuli with brisk
and unambiguous bursting (Brischoux, Chakraborty, Brierley, & Ungless, 2009Lammel, Ion, Roeper, &
Malenka, 2011Lammel et al., 2012). In addition, the offset of a sustained painful stimulus can trigger re-
bound burst firing in the majority-population of dopamine cells that are paused by the pain in the first place
(Brischoux et al., 2009) and there is compelling (if still indirect) evidence that the active avoidance of an
expected shock may trigger bursting as well at the time of the expected-but-avoided shock (Oleson, Gentry,
Chioma, & Cheer, 2012). Both of these relief-like signals are likely important in providing a positive rein-
forcement signal for potential escape/avoidance behaviors (Oleson & Cheer, 2013). Further, the ability to
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trigger dopamine bursts by this kind of mitigation of aversive primary PVs can sometimes be transferred to
a sizeable subset of the LV-type cells that reliably predict the occurrence of the aversive PV in the first place
(Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009). This makes sense because the same stimulus that predicts the aversive
event logically also will predict its offset and/or can learn to predict its successful prevention in the case of
avoidance. These positive reinforcement signals then can play a role in strengthening actions that mitigate
the threat.
Finally, these various activating mechanisms are undoubtedly important for engaging systems critical
for threat mitigation, including potentially the proactive strategy of the activating appetitive systems of goal
selection so as to find positive ways of escaping or avoiding the negative situation — e.g., looking for a tree
to climb to get away from a tiger. Once such an appetitive-type goal has become activated, the “common
currency” for dopamine signaling reflected in the equations and dynamics of gdPVLV as described above
can be fully leveraged so as to learn the best actions to take under the circumstances. We are in the process
of incorporating the most important of these additional mechanisms into the gdPVLV framework in order to
better accommodate negatively-valenced signals.
Relationship between gdPVLV and TD
Many of the important differences between the PVLV framework and the widely-adopted temporal dif-
ferences (TD) learning were reviewed in Hazy et al. (2010) and remain applicable. However, the more
central role of the Y-dot style temporal derivative in the gdPVLV formulation provided here brings the
framework in somewhat closer contact with the TD model, at least at a mathematical level. In particular,
our model of the LV component of gdPVLV will generate dopamine bursts that are essentially equivalent
to a TD model with state value estimates ˆV (s) that happen to produce a progressively increasing value as
one gets closer to the goal. Furthermore, after the chaining-based TD learning process has converged on a
stable set of state-value associations for a stable reward location in a given space, it should in fact produce
this gradient of increasing state values as one approaches the goal. This is indeed the classic result of TD
applied to a simple grid-world navigation environment (Sutton & Barto, 1990).
The key difference is that the gdPVLV model does not have to rely on a time-consuming chaining process
to learn individual state values — it instead learns only at the time of PVs, and relies on perceptual gen-
eralization functions and other dynamics (e.g., temporal integration in activation-based working memory
representations) to produce a graded estimates of distance to the goal. Because it is biased for this specific
form of goal-driven learning, the gdPVLV algorithm is less general than the TD algorithm, but this bias
is advantageous for the conditions under which it applies. This is a standard tradeoff in machine learning
algorithms (Geman, Bienenstock, & Doursat, 1992). Furthermore, as detailed above, the PVLV framework
provides specific functional roles for different neural systems that are compatible with the known biology,
while the TD framework is more monolithic and does not map obviously onto this menagerie of biological
substrates.
A Goal-Processing Pyramid in the Brain
One of the appealing features of the goals-first perspective is that it provides a consistent explanatory
framework for understanding motivated behavior across the full spectrum of mammalian brains and probably
at least some other classes as well. Anatomically, this is manifest as a kind of nested hierarchy of brain areas,
which we can refer to as the goal-processing pyramid (Figure 8). This pyramid is inverted, based at a narrow
aspect in the subcortical areas corresponding to the primary value (PV) system described above. With the
LV areas of the CeA and VS added we have the makings of the necessary infrastructure for supporting goal-
driven functioning. When particular motivational states become engaged (e.g., hunger, thirst), subcortical
areas specialized for processing relevant PVs will be up-regulated in a primitive form of attention. Similarly,
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Figure 8: The (inverted) pyramid of goals, anchored at the base in the most basic of primary values (PVs), divided
into positive and negative cases, handled by different areas e.g., positive = LH (lateral hypothalamus), negative = PBN
(parabrachial nucleus) and VMH (ventromedial hypothalamus). At the next level up are learned value (LV) areas
that can associate perceptual stimuli with PVs, to provide a prospective, anticipatory estimate of probability of goal
attainment, e.g., CeM (medial central nucleus of the amygdala) and CeC, CeL (capsular and lateral central amygdala).
The next level adds the basolateral amygdala (BLA), which has a much more extensive set of PV representations,
and it supports LV sensory learning as well. BLA feeds into the ventral striatum, where some neurons learn to
expect the timing, magnitude, and probability of PVs, contributing to dopamine responses reflecting the discrepancy
from these expectations. At the highest level are the limbic frontal areas, including insula which represents highly
differentiated primary values (e.g., different food tastes), OFC (orbital frontal cortex) which represents many different
goals, continuing up the medial wall of mPFC (medial PFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
the processing of sensory inputs previously associated with those PVs, such as food locations and similar
cues will activate LV representations leading to approach behavior. This low-level state biased for food-
seeking behaviors will remain engaged so long as you remain hungry, modulated by the phasic dopamine
signaling driven by the gdPVLV system.
At the next level up, the basal lateral amygdala (BLA) is known to function in much the same way as
the CeA, in that individual neurons are selective to specific PV events, and learn at the time of a PV to
associate active stimulus representations, and subsequently can fire based on these stimulus inputs alone,
providing an LV-like signal (Balleine & Killcross, 2006Baxter & Murray, 2002Belova, Paton, Morrison, &
Salzman, 2007Ono et al., 1995Paton, Belova, Morrison, & Salzman, 2006Schoenbaum, Chiba, & Gallagher,
1999Schoenbaum, Setlow, Saddoris, & Gallagher, 2003). Critically, however, the BLA is cortex-like his-
tologically and thus produces a much more fine-grained, differentiated map of underlying PV values and
their associated LV cues, as compared to the more coarse, basic values encoded in the CeA level. Further,
in addition to its unidirectional driving projection to the CeA, the BLA is bilaterally interconnected with
the orbital frontal cortex (OFC) and thus can drive anticipatory PV-like representations there in reaction to
LV-like cues in the environment (Pauli et al., 2012b). Finally, further distinguishing its role from the CeA,
the BLA connects densely and unidirectionally to the VS and thus is positioned to play a critical role in
driving gating of the OFC and related v/mPFC areas by the VS.
At the highest purely-affective level of the goal-processing pyramid are the OFC and anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), which are strongly interconnected with key substrates at lower levels of the pyramid (most
notably the BLA and VS) (Ongu¨r & Price, 2000Ongur, An, & Price, 1998Price & Drevets, 2010). As
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Figure 9: Map of goals in v/mPFC, based on the “follow the money” strategy of tracing connections down to sub-
cortical brainstem areas by Ongur & Price. The lateral OFC (lOFC), which overlaps with the anterior insula, provides
a sensory map of values from all the different senses (the insula is important for the olfactory, viceral, and taste sig-
nals). The medial OFC (mOFC) is interconnected with appetitive areas, and thus may represent positive values (PV +,
δlv+) (Noonan et al., 2010). Moving up the medial wall, the subgenual ACC (sgACC) interconnects with aversive
areas (PV −, δlv−) (Ongur & Price, 2000). Still further up is the pregenual ACC (pgACC), which interconnects with
subcortical areas important for arousal, and may represent an intensity dimension (Chou et al., 2003). The further
dorsal and posterior ACC areas may encode more motor-action specific values, including probability of error, effort,
uncertainty, conflict, etc (Alexander & Brown, 2010; Kennerley & Walton, 2011). These values can play an important
role in shaping the goal selection process. Finally, the rostral medial PFC (rmPFC) is interconnected with the hip-
pocampus (Carmichael & Price, 1995), and may be particularly important in marshalling prior episodic memories in
the goal selection phase (Cabeza, et al, 1997). Functional neuroimaging studies (e.g., Roy et al, 2012) also suggest
that this area may be important for social goals.
diagrammed in Figure 9, this grounding in lower-level systems contributes to an overall “map of goals”, but
at this cortical level is also much more fine-grained and plastic than the lower levels, supporting ongoing
learning of novel and/or changing goal representations. This is by virtue of it being the main outpost of
the goal system within the vast expanse of the neocortex, which is generally thought to be only weakly
genetically configured, with considerable developmental learning taking place through activity-dependent
plasticity mechanisms. Also, as regions of frontal cortex, the OFC and ACC can support robust active
maintenance of neural firing over time (Frank & Claus, 2006Pauli et al., 2012b), giving these areas the
ability to sustain active goal firing over longer durations. We discuss these dynamics in more detail below.
Note that overall this functional organization preserves the What vs. How organization for frontal cortex
(O’Reilly, 2010). Specifically, the ventral What pathways throughout the neocortex are thought to encode
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stimulus identity information, while the dorsal How pathways transform stimulus information to guide mo-
tor control (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982Goodale & Milner, 1992). When mapped onto the v/mPFC areas,
the most ventral area, OFC, has much more directly stimulus-driven What-like representations (Holland &
Gallagher, 2004Murray, O’Doherty, & Schoenbaum, 2007Noonan et al., 2010West, DesJardin, Gale, &
Malkova, 2011), whereas the most dorsal area, ACC, is much more directly interconnected with the motor
control pathways in dlPFC, and is thought to play a more direct role in guiding action selection on the basis of
affective values (Kouneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth,
2009Alexander & Brown, 2010Kennerley & Walton, 2011Kolling, Behrens, Mars, & Rushworth, 2012Ami-
tai Shenhav, 2013). This specific contrast between OFC and ACC has been emphasized particularly convinc-
ingly by Rushworth and colleagues (Rushworth, Behrens, Rudebeck, & Walton, 2007Rudebeck, Behrens,
Kennerley, Baxter, Buckley, Walton, & Rushworth, 2008). The areas between these two ventral and dorsal
extremes may play more integrative roles. For example, the pregenual ACC may represent overall arousal
and intensity (Chou, Scammell, Gooley, Gaus, Saper, & Lu, 2003Mobbs, Marchant, Hassabis, Seymour,
Tan, Gray, Petrovic, Dolan, & Frith, 2009Nemeth, Hegedus, & Molnar, 1988), while the most anterior
rostral medial PFC area may integrate affective information with episodic memories (Carmichael & Price,
1996Cabeza, Kapur, & Tulving, 1997Gilbert, Spengler, Simons, Steele, Lawrie, Frith, & Burgess, 2006),
and otherwise play an integrative function (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012). Interestingly, a similar map
was developed based on analyzing a range of different human fMRI studies (Roy et al., 2012).
Given the nature of the map goals in the v/mPFC as characterized above, we can associate the stimulus-
driven OFC areas as being more LV-like overall, in providing stimulus-driven graded representations of
progress toward goals. In contrast, the ACC areas may be more important for representing the affective
consequences of different potential courses of action, which then shape the goal selection process. The
ACC and OFC are tightly interconnected, so it is likely that both are involved in both goal selection and
ongoing goal engagement and monitoring processes. It is quite plausible that active maintenance of the
goal is distributed across lateral PFC areas as well. Consistent with many other examples in the brain, there
is no single locus for a given goal representation — it is distributed across multiple different areas which
each contribute important content and interconnections to the overall goal state. We are optimistic that
approaching the representations in these areas from a goal-driven perspective may shed new light on their
respective overall contributions, and dynamics at different points in the goal selection vs. goal engagement
processing. For example, a network of ACC, OFC, and vlPFC areas have been associated with the degree
of motivated reasoning or belief bias exhibited by people (Westen et al., 2006Stollstorff, Vartanian, & Goel,
2012) — this is consistent with the idea that these areas reflect an engaged, maintained goal state that is
driving subsequent cognition in a goal-directed manner.
A Rough Taxonomy of Primary Values
There are many different taxonomies of emotional and motivational states that could be leveraged to
produce a taxonomy of primary values in the human brain (Maslow, 1943Reiss, 2004), but a full treatment of
this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. We offer a brief summary here that attempts to put emotional and
other motivational states into a goal-centric perspective, elaborating upon the core list provided in Figure 2.
As noted above, we distinguish affective states vs. outcomes, where affective states can function somewhat
like a drive (Hull, 1943), and are more diffuse and temporally extended.
Reiss (2004) has developed a list of 16 intrinsic motivations, which have been established through
factor analysis techniques. They include some listed in Figure 2, and are as follows (with some
of our own interpretation added, including both Reiss’s label for the motive and the intrinsic feeling
or affective state): Power/Dominance/Efficacy, Curiosity/Wonder, Independence/Freedom, Status/Self-
importance, Social contact/Fun, Vengeance/Vindication, Honor/Loyalty, Idealism/Compassion, Physical
exercise/Vitality/Strength, Romance/Lust, Family/Love, Order/Stability, Eating/Satiation (presumably in-
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cludes thirst), Acceptance/Self-confidence, Tranquility/Safety (lack of fear), Saving/Ownership. Because
these are derived from factor analysis based on human verbal reports, they may miss a few things, and some
of the factors could be rotated into different primary dimensions. For example, the need to share has been
argued to be a critical human motivation (Tomasello, 2001), which can support cultural transmission through
direct instruction (e.g., Huang, Hazy, Herd, & O’Reilly, 2013) and imitation (e.g., Meltzoff, 1985Meltzoff,
1988Meltzoff & Decety, 2003), which are widely regarded as essential for bootstrapping human cognitive
abilities. Hate is missing as an obvious complement to Love, and the goal-related feelings are notably absent
as well. Embarrassment, which has strong physiological correlates, seems likely to be primary, though it
could be argued to be the negative side of status or social acceptance.
The following specific affective states merit more detailed discussion, due to their complexity and general
issues they illustrate:
Fear: Fear is a negative valence state resulting from the perception of a threat to life or other things of
value, from predators or other sources of danger. It can be seen as a negative valence drive-like state akin
to hunger, in that it serves to motivate avoidance or aggressive behavior to overcome the fear if possible.
But it is triggered by external stimuli, not internal ones, and is interesting in being largely anticipatory and
perceptual in nature, instead of being driven by actual experienced changes in bodily state. The successful
overcoming of fear states is experienced as a positive valenced relief outcome. Unlike eating, there is not
obviously a specific sensory pathway or characteristic phasic stimuli that define the relief outcome, however,
so it is not clear if there is a discrete PV state that corresponds to this relief state, or whether it is necessarily
a second-order derived outcome reflecting the absence of a formerly negative state. Also, because it is
perceptual and anticipatory, fear is particularly subject to appraisal dynamics, and can often be mitigated by
reappraisal and the decision to mentally overcome the state (e.g., finding some courage). The brain areas
involved in fear reappraisal are some of the same involved in goal-driven cognition, including the dlPFC
which plays a role in fear reappraisal and other types of emotion regulation (Hartley & Phelps, 2010), and the
vmPFC, which plays an important role in fear extinction and reversal through connections with the amygdala
and striatum (Daniela & R., 2010). Fear can be driven by US-like stimuli (e.g., genetically coded predator
detection), other experienced negative outcomes (e.g., pain), and also more LV-like CSs that were associated
with prior negative outcomes. By drawing a clear dividing line between affective states and goal-relevant
PV outcomes, we can partition the fear system into this more diffuse state-like side, even though it also has
conditioning-like properties as well, which depend on many of the same neural mechanisms captured by the
PVLV system. However, the learning and activation dynamics of the fear system may be quite different than
that of the goal-driven PVLV system, particularly with respect to the important connection to the VS gating
system described in the next section.
Pain: Pain like fear is a negative valence state, but it is typically thought of as a direct consequence of
bodily harm of some sort. Critically, pain typically emerges as a reaction to insult, and is not necessarily
available prospectively to guide goal selection. In this sense, pain is a negative outcome, not a drive state per
se. Pain does persist over time, however, and can drive various goals to treat or manage the pain itself, and
in this case any relief that is experienced can be viewed as a positive relief PV outcome associated with such
goals. Anticipated pain, if severe enough, is likely to activate the fear system, and there is also evidence
that learned pain expectations can mediate activity in pain-sensitive regions through activity in the OFC and
striatum (Atlas, Bolger, Lindquist, & Wager, 2010). Another interesting form of learning in the pain system
is the well-known placebo effect, which has been shown to alter activity in several pain-sensitive regions
(Watson, El-Deredy, Iannetti, Lloyd, Tracey, Vogt, Nadeau, & Jones, 2009Wager, Rilling, Smith, Sokolik,
Casey, Davidson, Kosslyn, Rose, & Cohen, 2004Eippert, Bingel, Schoell, Yacubian, Klinger, Lorenz, &
Buchel, 2009Petrovic, Kalso, Petersson, & Ingvar, 2002).
One case of anticipated pain that is very relevant to the goal-driven system is when it functions as a
cost-like variable, like effort, where lower levels of pain are regarded as inevitable negative consequences to
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desired goal achievement (e.g., “no pain, no gain”). As such, we would expect that the ACC would represent
these lower levels of pain much like effort is represented, whereas higher levels of pain would drive the
fear system, creating a complex bifurcation in how pain is represented depending on intensity. Indeed,
the sgACC was involved in subjective valuation in a decision-making task involving tradeoffs between
different levels of pain and reward, and sgACC-amygdala connectivity was modulated by money only under
high pain conditions (Park, Kahnt, Rieskamp, & Heekeren, 2011). As suggested earlier, we may be able
to effectively ignore pain signals when in a goal engaged state, even as these costs are being tallied for
later goal selection, which is consistent with the strong influence of PFC and striatum on expectations and
learning about pain and analgesia (Atlas, Whittington, Lindquist, Wielgosz, Sonty, & Wager, 2012Wager,
Atlas, Leotti, & Rilling, 2011), and evidence suggesting that the mPFC is dysregulated for chronic pain
patients (Apkarian, 2008). Finally, pain appears to serve as a concrete anchor to many higher-level forms of
negative outcomes that are not viscerally painful, but people describe them as such, and they activate many
of the same neural pathways (Kross, Berman, Mischel, Smith, & Wager, 2011Eisenberger, 2012). Thus,
pain may serve as a kind of universal negative PV pathway for many different outcomes, which evolution
may have co-opted to take advantage of the low-level neuromodulatory pathways that were already in place.
Stress, Uncertainty: These are another category of negative valence states that need to be addressed —
are these just special cases of the overall fear system, or are there specialized neural systems and intrinsic
motivations associated directly with stress and uncertainty? The evidence strongly favors the latter: the
stress system is strongly associated with the HPA (hypothalamic, pituitary, adrenal) axis and the release of
corticotrophin-releasing factor (CRF), under top-down regulation by limbic brain areas such as the mPFC,
amygdala and NAc (Franklin, Saab, & Mansuy, 2012). The stress system interacts with the dopamine sys-
tem, and influences plasticity and interactions with other neuromodulators in several limbic brain regions,
the specifics of which are beyond the scope of this article (Belujon & Grace, 2011Russo, Murrough, Han,
Charney, & Nestler, 2012Cabib & Puglisi-Allegra, 2012). Additionally, there may be specialized representa-
tions for uncertainty in several areas, including brainstem areas such as the anterodorsal septum (Monosov &
Hikosaka, 2013) and the anterior cingulate cortex (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). Connections between re-
gions of the BNST (bed nucleus of the stria terminalis) and hypothalamic and brainstem regions are also
important for the modulation of behavioral effects of anxiety and stress, and this region plays an impor-
tant role in the integration of stress and reward information through connections with the the VTA. (Kim,
Adhikari, Lee, Marshel, Kim, Mallory, Lo, Pak, Mattis, Lim, Malenka, Warden, Neve, Tye, & Deisseroth,
2013Jennings, Sparta, Stamatakis, Ung, Pleil, Kash, & Stuber, 2013Flavin & Winder, 2013).
Happiness, Disappointment, Sadness, Frustration, Anger, Boredom, Depression: These various
goal-associated affective states are particularly interesting in relation to the centrality of these affective
states in daily human life. It is said that maximizing happiness is the broader goal of life, where this
form of happiness is clearly distinguished from raw hedonistic pleasure. In the goal-driven framework,
some PV outcomes are experienced as pleasurable (positive primary valence), but the larger context is
accomplishing active goals, which leads to happiness as distinct from pleasure. Although dopamine was
originally associated directly with hedonic pleasure (e.g., Wise, 1980), it is now clear that it plays a much
more functional role in goal-driven motivated behavior — a distinction which has been labeled as liking
(hedonic pleasure) vs. wanting (motivated behavior) (Berridge & Robinson, 1998Berridge & Robinson,
2003Salamone & Correa, 2012). The clearest case for dissociating these two states is when accomplishing a
goal driven by a strong negative valence situation — e.g., working hard against many challenges to achieve
something difficult and important. Daily life is arduous and full of negative valence, but the progress and
eventual accomplishment result in extreme Happiness and a feeling of life satisfaction. This is not too far
from the so-called American Dream ideal, which may be a cultural construct that closely aligns with the
goal-driven structure of our brains.
Finally, at the most abstract level, various 2D organizations of some emotional states have been proposed,
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Figure 10: Approach vs. Avoidance organization of affective states, according to Carver & Scheier (1982), merged
with the organization proposed by Rolls (2005) based on reward vs. punishment, as proposed by Carver & Harmon-
Jones (2009).
for example along positive vs. negative affect dimensions (Watson & Tellegen, 1985Russell & Barrett,
1999), or along approach vs. avoidance dimensions (Figure 10; Carver & Scheier, 1982), which can be
aligned with reward and punishment axes (Rolls, 2005Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). The approach axis
aligns well with the goal-driven processing states described above, but we are not sure at this point how to
integrate the avoidance axis. In many cases, avoidance situations can be turned into approach situations,
thereby realigning completely with our framework. It remains unclear how direct punishment avoidance
would mobilize cognition and behavior without being mediated proximally by these approach goals — we
return to this issue in the Discussion section. Interestingly, it does appear that prefrontal cortex has at least
some degree of lateralization according to approach vs. avoidance dominance, as contrasted with basic
positive vs. negative affect dimensions. This was established by examining the key affective state of anger,
which is negatively valenced, but drives approach behavior, and can thus dissociate valence from approach
vs. avoidance (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). There is also a question as to whether intensity or arousal
is coded separately from valence or more specific states — for example the classic James-Lange theory and
modern incarnations thereof argue that we just interpret raw bodily arousal signals or somatic markers (e.g.,
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005Russell & Barrett, 1999). The pgACC as mentioned above may
provide a locus for such independent coding of arousal, at the same time it is likely that intensity is encoded
within each specific affective state.
In summary, it seems clear that there are a multitude of innate motivational or affective states, but the
biologically privileged dimensions of this space have yet to be established. From a goal-driven cognition
perspective, the different affective states have important implications for appropriate outcomes and action
plans, likely at a very fine-grained level. Not all negative or positive states are equivalent — fear, pain, and
anger each have very different dynamics and implications, and the brain is likely to take advantage of these
differences. Thus, it is important to avoid the temptation to reduce the dimensionality of this space to the
level of e.g., phasic dopamine dynamics — those are just one element of a much richer overall space. It is
plausible that other neuromodulators may expand the dimensionality of the space (e.g., Doya, 2002Doya,
2008), but even there, v/mPFC is a very large space that has plenty of room for very high dimensional
representations of affective states and goals.
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Discussion
We have presented a theoretical framework, and initial biologically-based computational model, based
around the central idea that goals are primary, and one generally must have an active goal engaged. The
process of selecting a new goal is characterized by a careful weighing of costs and benefits, in part because
once a goal is selected and engaged, it comes to dominate the effective value function of the organism,
biased toward rewarding progress toward the goal. This strong dichotomy between the conservative value
function at work during goal selection versus the optimistic, goal-dominated value function during goal
engaged mode is consistent with a number of anecdotal phenomena, and our broader goal-driven framework
and computational model is consistent with a wide range of cognitive neuroscience data. In the remainder
of this discussion, we discuss related computational modeling work, followed by some major unresolved
issues, and highlight a few of the broader implications of the framework to understanding clinical disorders
and daily life.
Other Computational Models of Goal-Driven Cognition
Computational models that have incorporated a goal-driven component have done so largely within a
symbolic processing framework (Sun, 2009Anderson, 1990Leake & Ram, 1995), where the goal selec-
tion process can be implemented explicitly and without much complication. For example, in the ACT-R
framework (Anderson, 1990Anderson & Lebiere, 1998Anderson, Bothell, Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere, &
Qin, 2004), there is an explicit goal buffer, and specific productions load and update this buffer to guide
progress toward goal achievement. And the contents of the goal buffer can drive spreading activation to bias
goal-relevant information and processing in other parts of the architecture. But there is no specific connec-
tion between goal states and intrinsic motivations. In contrast, the CLARION architecture (Sun, 2009) has
incorporated many of the intrinsic motivations described by Reiss (2004), to specifically drive an explicit
goal selection process, which lies at the center of multiple modules within the architecture. Once active,
the symbolically-represented goals serve to bias the action selection process. The overall dynamics of the
goal selection process seem to be based on a Hull-style drive reduction model (Hull, 1943), with new goals
selected when the drive activation associated with a goal is reduced below a given threshold. In contrast, our
framework is centered around the principle that goals contain a representation of the desired outcome end
state, and are thus self-terminating when this end is achieved. Finally, the goal-driven framework of Leake
and Ram (1995) articulates many of the benefits of a goal-driven approach, within an overall symbolic
architecture.
More recently, other modeling approaches are beginning to incorporate aspects of goal-driven behavior.
For example, the internal model hypothesized in the model-based reinforcement learning (RL) approach
(Daw et al., 2005Dayan, 2009Rangel & Hare, 2010) has a lot in common with our construct of a goal-
space. Of particular relevance to the goals-first perspective, Solway and Botvinick (2012) have recently
incorporated a novel Bayesian approach to essentially run the internal model backwards to find the optimal
policy that is most likely to achieve the maximum reward. In a sense, by going backwards from assumed
perfect success they only have to do the math once. Nonetheless, their approach differs in fundamental ways
from the neural network-based, goals-first approach proposed here. For example, their outcomes are simple
scalar quantities of abstract value and thus lack the grounding in real-world representations by which biasing
of appropriate subgoals and action plans can actually occur. Furthermore, the notion of a goal as an actively
maintained representation that guides behavior until its target end state is achieved, which is central to our
approach, is missing. In effect, the Solway and Botvinick (2012) model only addresses the planning aspect
of the process, not the full architecture of goal-driven cognition.
The theoretical framework articulated in Pezzulo and Castelfranchi (2009) covers a lot of territory in
common with our model (and includes a comprehensive discussion of other relevant literature), while focus-
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ing mainly on the sensory-motor (“cold”) aspects of the space. One central hypothesis in their framework,
shared by a number of other theorists (e.g., Hommel, 2004), is based on the notion of ideomotor representa-
tions, which are action representations that are activated and controlled by an anticipatory representation of
their desired effect (James, 1890). The appealing idea is that one can somehow invert the natural learning
of action→ effect sequences, to then drive effect→ action selection. However, it is not clear how well that
key inversion process actually works in practice for realistically complex motor control (Herbort & Butz,
2012M.I. & D.E., 1992). The goals-first framework provides a different alternative: actions are driven from
the start by engaged goals, which contain at least some encoding of the desired effect. Learning can tune
these action→ effect representations, but by having the goal representations active from the start, the bind-
ing of outcomes to goal representations is more straightforward and effective. The Pezzulo and Castelfranchi
(2009) framework also relies to some extent on the forward projection process to anticipate the outcomes of
actions — this is another process that we think is most often avoided by goal-selection happening first. We
do not believe that non-human animals have much capacity for this kind of look-ahead process (despite the
popularity of this idea, and what we consider to be ambiguous evidence; Penny, Zeidman, & Burgess, 2013).
Furthermore, data suggests that people avoid it to a large extent (even in advanced game playing situations
such as chess where this kind of lookahead is strategically quite beneficial; Gobet & Simon, 1996).
Major Outstanding Issues
Avoidance Goals, and Lateralization of the Goal Sytem
The goals-first framework articulated in this paper is centered around approach goals with positive va-
lence outcomes. In the case of aversive situations and states, these goals are directed toward overcoming
adversity, whether it is hunger, fear or any other aversive state (Figure 2). However, there is a considerable
literature on the notion that the frontal cortex is lateralized according to approach (left lateralized) ver-
sus avoidance (right lateralized) (Carver & White, 1994Sutton & Davidson, 1997Davidson, 2000Carver &
Harmon-Jones, 2009Spielberg, Heller, & Miller, 2013Kelley, Hortensius, & Harmon-Jones, 2013). The key
question is thus: how does avoidance work to drive behavior, if not through positive approach goals? We
can see two distinctive alternatives:
• Just add a negative sign to everything, so that the PV goal is directly to reduce or eliminate the negative
state (as opposed to approaching a positive state), and the LV progress monitoring is proportional
to the gradient of reduction of proximity to the negative stimuli (i.e., getting further away from a
predator). This is consistent with various proposals in the literature (Carver, 2006Elliot, 2006Higgins,
1997). The key difference here is that it is hard to concretely assess the end point associated with this
kind of avoidance goal — you can’t get infinitely far away from a predator, and you never know if it
might be lurking behind something and just about to pounce. Similarly, it tends to be more difficult
to formulate concrete action plans based on avoidance, without focusing on a specific positive goal
— “run away” is much less specific than “run toward this specific safe location”. Thus, consistent
with subjective experience, avoidance goals, if they exist, are likely to be more free-floating and
amorphous, and not as effective in driving cognitive and action systems compared to the more concrete
approach goals.
• Reconceptualize the right hemisphere activation as representing a space of alternative goals, action
plans, and associated state information (of both positive and negative valence), that are accumulated
and maintained as possible competitors or alternatives to the dominant goals and plans represented
in the left hemisphere. Critically, this right hemisphere information can be actively maintained and
updated, without interfering with the current active goals and action plans — the hemispheric later-
alization can play the critical functional role of designating that class of information as “offline” for
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the purposes of behavioral control. In the case of avoidance goals, the right hemisphere would main-
tain all the worries and concerns and negative state information, which are essential to keep online
and update as things progress, and this information can inform the selection and engagement of new
goal states, but these new active goal states are represented always in left hemisphere, driving posi-
tive approach goal dynamics as conceptualized in this paper. This framework is consistent with data
showing that the right ventral lateral PFC is monitoring for low-frequency signals that indicate a need
to alter the dominant task, e.g., in the stop-signal paradigm (Chatham, Claus, Kim, Curran, Banich, &
Munakata, 2012Munakata, Herd, Chatham, Depue, Banich, & O’Reilly, 2011). Also, an fMRI study
localized a secondary task to the right frontal cortex while the dominant task was localized to the left
(Charron & Koechlin, 2010). Furthermore, an electrical stimulation paradigm was able to convert
anger (an active approach motivation) to rumination (a passive response to adversity) by increasing
right vs. left frontal activation (Kelley et al., 2013).
One potential source of data to distinguish among these alternatives is individual differences between
anxiety and depression — higher depression individuals generate fewer approach goals, compared to higher
anxiety individuals who generate more avoidance plans (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004). In either case, it
does seem that having an overall avoidance focus compared to an approach focus results in negative overall
cognitive and emotional outcomes (Sideridis, 2005Elliot & Sheldon, 1997). Interestingly, positive outcomes
can sometimes be associated with goal abandonment, but this seems to depend on being able to move past
the abandoned goal within a larger overall approach goal (Wrosch et al., 2003).
Subgoals and Goal Learning
To this point, we’ve only considered goals that are grounded directly in primary values (PVs), which we
assume to be genetically encoded, and thus a closed-class. The system would be much more open-ended
and powerful, and also much more dangerous, if it could develop novel goal representations. One important
category of such representations are subgoals that reliably lead to achieving a PV, but are not themselves
directly associated with a closed-class PV. There are multiple challenges in getting this to work. First, the
overarching PV goal must somehow drive the learning of any intervening subgoals — this implies that
the overarching PV goal must be engaged first, which is not unreasonable, but nevertheless represents an
important constraint. The incremental dopamine bursts in response to progress on the outer PV goal must
then reinforce Go firing for the subgoal. In effect, the relationship is identical to that of goal and action. But
the PV-based grounding of the VS gating signals does not operate here.
Thus, one overall take is to say that subgoals not directly associated with a PV outcome are indis-
tinguishable from dlPFC action representations, and indeed that is quite possibly where they exclusively
reside. Another alternative is to allow for grounded PVs to support the learning of second-order PV-like
neurons in higher areas of the goal pyramid, potentially including the ventral striatum, so that the same
PV-based grounding of the VS gating signals can still hold. The challenge here then becomes delineating
the conditions under which this second-order PV learning operates, so as to not become too open-ended and
lead to the pursuit of manifestly maladaptive outcomes. We do know that only neurons in the BLA, but
not CeA, are important for second-order conditioning (Hatfield, Han, Conley, & Holland, 1996), and that
learning beyond second-order is extremely limited or nonexistent (Denny & Ratner, 1970Dinsmoor, 2001).
Thus, in contradiction to the TD chaining model, the brain appears to treat higher-order conditioning with
extreme caution, and it is unclear at this time whether even the second-order level is sufficiently broadly
enabled to play a significant role in subgoal learning. As we develop our computational models to include a
subgoaling ability, we will confront and hopefully at least provisionally resolve these important issues.
34 Goal-Driven Cognition
High-level strategic action vs. lower-level perceptual-motor control
The form of goal-driven processing that is the focus of this paper can be characterized as high-level
strategic processing (deciding among multiple options, e.g., whether to go out to eat or cook dinner), as
contrasted with the more continuous tactical control required for dynamic motor control (e.g., how to ac-
tually slice food with a knife while making dinner). The basal-ganglia / frontal cortical system seems
particularly well suited for making the more discrete strategic decisions, while the cerebellum interacting
with the parietal cortex seems more well-suited for the dynamic online control aspects. Indeed, there is evi-
dence for dedicated perceptual-motor goal spaces in various regions in parietal cortex (Buneo & Andersen,
2006), and electrical stimulation in parietal can cause the feeling of having an intention to execute a motor
movement (Desmurget, Reilly, Richard, Szathmari, Mottolese, & Sirigu, 2009). We hypothesize that these
perceptual-motor goal spaces develop through a combination of appropriate genetically-determined initial
connectivity, and scaffolding from affective goal systems. One suggestive indication that the domains of on-
line perceptual-motor control and higher-level goal and action selection have very different computational
demands, is that there is surprisingly little direct communication between the cerebellum and the basal gan-
glia and their respective paths through the thalamus to the cortex are largely segregated (e.g., Percheron,
Francois, Talbi, Yelnik, & Fenelon, 1996). Recent work has emphasized some focal areas of interconnec-
tivity however (Bostan, Dum, & Strick, 2013), and the nature of these interactions should be instructive for
our overall framework.
Another important way in which the basal ganglia and perceptual-motor systems may differ is in the
use of positive feedback vs. negative feedback dynamics. Powers (1973) and others (e.g., Miller et al.,
1960Carver & Scheier, 1982) have persuasively argued that a cybernetic-style negative feedback controller
model is particularly powerful for online perceptual-motor control. Here, goals serve as reference values that
are compared against current perceptual inputs, and discrepancies or disturbances lead to behavioral actions
that minimize this discrepancy. In contrast, the dopamine-based learning that is central to understanding
how the basal ganglia operates (and central to our overall framework) has a strong positive-feedback re-
inforcement learning dynamic, where, over the course of learning, some representations become stronger
and more likely to be activated, while others are attenuated. More generally, we believe that learning is
essential to understanding many aspects of the system, because our initial starting state is so impoverished,
and much of our intelligence must be built up slowly over the developmental learning process. At a very
abstract level, having such a big investment in learning suggests that our brains evolved in relatively stable
environments where much of what we learn can be applied productively throughout our lives. In contrast,
the hallmark of the negative feedback control systems is their extreme flexibility in the face of all manner
of unpredictable disturbances, and some of this flexibility is lost once learning mechanisms are introduced.
These differences are emblematic of the distinctions between strategic and tactical domains, where the for-
mer benefits from wisdom and experience, and the latter benefits from flexibility and ability to deal with
whatever comes along. Clearly, both of these dynamics have their tradeoffs, and as in many other cases in
the brain, it is likely that different neural systems optimize each of these types of control (i.e., basal ganglia
for reinforcement learning, and cerebellum for negative feedback control).
Novel problem solving
Finally, we address perhaps the most challenging problem facing cognitive neuroscience generally, in-
cluding the goals-first framework: novel, challenging situations that require more advanced problem-solving
techniques, which really tap the special cognitive abilities of the human brain. Fundamentally, the goal-
driven framework stipulates that hard problems are solved in goal-space first, and only then are actions
undertaken. Thus, you have to “see” the path to the solution first. This doesn’t mean the whole solution
needs to be worked out entirely in advance, but at least the shape of the solution and the first step need to
be there. A universal weak solution to hard problems is to break them down into more tractable smaller
problems, and again this is something that would be done in goal space first. All of this requires specific,
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probably at least partially culturally-transmitted strategies for goal-space processing. How these strategies
are learned and executed constitutes yet another major challenge for this framework. Finally, even when
all else fails and you have to engage in random trial-and-error exploration, the key point is that this explo-
ration occurs in goal space first, and perhaps then also in action space within the context of an engaged
goal. This allows the goal to direct and evaluate the action selection process as progress is either made or
not. Furthermore, if the whole thing turns out to be a success, the resulting learning will make this novel
goal-action complex more available as a possible solution to similar predicaments in the future. A strong
bias to generally have a tractable goal guiding behavior would naturally support this goal-first exploration
process.
Potential Relevance to Clinical Disorders
Clinically, the goals-first perspective is consistent with the profiles of major clinical disorders includ-
ing depression (major depressive disorder, MDD), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and ADHD. As
noted earlier, we can think of depression as characterized an inability to enter the goal-engaged state, result-
ing in pervasive feelings of fatigue and motivational anhedonia (Demyttenaere et al., 2005Salamone et al.,
2007Treadway & Zald, 2011Salamone & Correa, 2012). This view of MDD (which is only recently taking
hold, overcoming the traditional view that it is an inability to experience pleasure derived from impaired
dopamine function; Wise & Rompre, 1989Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011), is consistent with our
overall framework at multiple levels. For example, considerable data implicates the ventral striatum (nu-
cleus accumbens) dopamine system in MDD, along with sub-genual ACC (sgACC), and many other areas
of the v/mPFC goal processing system (Price & Drevets, 2010Mayberg, Brannan, Mahurin, Jerabek, Brick-
man, Tekell, Silva, McGinnis, Glass, Martin, & Fox, 1997). In particular the sgACC, which according to
the map of goals presented above is important for encoding negative valence information, appears to be
over-activated in MDD. Our interpretation is that MDD represents a vicious feedback loop between ini-
tial negative affective states combined with an inability to activate positive goals to overcome these states,
and the resulting negative affect associated with inability to become goal-engaged. The result is sustained
negative affect and motivational anhedonia (i.e., apathy, which is an important component of MDD and
other related disorders), corresponding to excessive activation of the sgACC and the NoGo pathways in
the VS/NAcc. This inability to drive goal activation then also drives an overall deactivation of the dlPFC
(Price & Drevets, 2010), with various sources suggesting a right vs. left lateralization imbalance (Rosa-
dini & Rossi, 1967Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009) consistent with the avoidance goals discussion above.
This model of depression is generally consistent with the learned helplessness model (Maier, 1984Maier &
Watkins, 2010Maier & Seligman, 1976), which was recently shown to involve lateral habenula dopamine
modulation (Li, Piriz, Mirrione, Chung, Proulx, Schulz, Henn, & Malinow, 2011). However, for the vicious
circle feedback to be sustained enough to produce MDD symptoms, there likely needs to be significant neg-
ative valence activation that is strong enough to prevent the natural positive feedback of goal engagement
from taking over again relatively soon (and/or a biological disorder with similar effects) — it is unlikely that
a few exposures to uncontrollable shock rise to that level.
OCD is a particularly interesting case for the relationship between aversive states and approach-related
goals to overcome them — the central dynamic in this condition is that ritual behaviors are motivated by
aversive intrusive thoughts and fears (Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009). As discussed in the context of
aversive goals above, it is difficult to know when the aversive condition is over, especially when it involves
fears of things like germ contamination or the possibility of losing control and causing harm to others,
which are common fears in OCD. Thus, the aversive states tend to persist, and because the rituals are
also not particularly effective in directly overcoming the adversity (even though they are positive concrete
actions motivated by them), the whole condition enters a vicious cycle. This cycle is reinforced through
the temporary feelings of relief provided by the ritual behaviors, to the point that it becomes difficult to
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overcome. Thus, OCD represents a aberrant attractor state of the goal-driven system, and a variety of sources
strongly implicate the OFC and ventral striatum in this disorder (Abramowitz et al., 2009). Hopefully, a
clearer understanding of these systems can lead to better treatments — there are various places where this
cycle could be broken, and some may be more effective and amenable to treatment than others.
Although ADHD has long been thought to involve deficits in executive function, a more recent perspec-
tive emphasizes the prominent role of motivation in this disorder (Castellanos, Sonuga-Barke, Milham, &
Tannock, 2006Dovis, Van der Oord, Wiers, & Prins, 2012Slusarek, Velling, Bunk, & Eggers, 2001). In
this view, people with ADHD have difficulty sustaining activation of a given goal state over time, because
they lose motivation and become interested in doing something else. When brought into the lab and given
relatively short tests of executive function under strong external demand characteristics, ADHD patients can
often perform quite well. Furthermore, motivational manipulations have relatively strong effects, serving
to at least partially ameliorate any observed deficits (Dovis et al., 2012Slusarek et al., 2001). The motiva-
tional account also helps to make sense of the increase in response time variability observed in these patients
(Castellanos et al., 2006Frank, Santamaria, O’Reilly, & Willcutt, 2007) — sometimes they are engaged in
the task, and other times they are not. One intriguing possibility in this context is that the neuromodulator
noradrenaline (NA, also known as norepinephrine or NE), which has been implicated in the exploration
vs. exploitation tradeoff in reinforcement learning (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005) and in ADHD (Swanson,
Perry, Koch-Krueger, Katner, Svensson, & Bymaster, 2006Frank et al., 2007), could reflect, and/or affect,
the current level of goal engagement. In the goal-driven framework, exploitation means sticking with the
current goal, and exploration means switching to an alternative goal.
In any case, it is likely that when left to their own devices in the real world, with many more alternative
goals than in a lab experiment, goal engagement in ADHD patients could be more fleeting, and thus the
disorder more severe than the lab experiments would otherwise suggest. The goal-driven perspective can
offer novel avenues for treatment, by focusing on the dynamics of goal engagement and maintenance. For
example, people could be trained to engage in a more deliberate attempt to break longer goals into more
tangible, shorter subgoals, that would deliver more continuous graded reward signals, and thus reinforce
goal engagement. More generally, it seems that everyone could benefit from such training, to be more
effectively engaged in anything that they want to achieve. This is supported by work suggesting that imple-
mentation intentions specifying when, where and how to achieve a particular goal have a positive effect on
goal attainment. (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006).
Insights into Cognitive Biases and their Mitigation
The goals-first framework posits that people’s evaluations of cost/benefit tradeoffs and other decisional
factors may be differentially biased depending on whether they have a goal currently engaged or not. When
a goal is engaged, estimates of costs (and indeed subjective experiences of pain and effort) are likely under-
estimated, whereas they are likely to be more rationally estimated otherwise. Furthermore, the dominance
of the engaged goal and reluctance to abandon it can give rise to a strong confirmation bias, as mentioned
earlier. This confirmation bias is based in part on the active goal activating associated hypotheses and evi-
dence (Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010). Maintained goals can also account for the pervasive phenomena of
the sunk cost fallacy, where people irrationally persist in pursuing a given goal despite mounting losses, and
motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990Westen et al., 2006Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011), in which
people arrive at conclusions that are not logically correct, but satisfy personal goals (such as gaining in-
group approval). Our framework suggests potentially novel angles for addressing these pervasive cognitive
biases, by focusing on the source of the problem (the goal engaged state) and attempting to temporarily dis-
engage or otherwise distance the individual from their goals, so as to facilitate a more rational evaluation of
the current situation. Interestingly, available evidence suggests that for disengaged goals, increasing psycho-
logical distance results in less consideration of costs (Trope & Liberman, 2010), which may mean that more
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proximal choices are more carefully evaluated as concrete candidates for goal selection. We maintain that
the results should go the other way when examining engaged vs. proximal disengaged goals, or as a function
of manipulations to distance people from currently engaged goals. More broadly, the evidence about emo-
tional state and rationality of judgments has been mixed (despite the pervasive belief that depressed people
are more rational) (Pham, 2007), but the bias toward rumination associated with negative mood may result
in more carefully considered solutions to challenging problems, and in this way be adaptive (Andrews &
Thomson, 2009).
Application to Daily Life
The goal-driven perspective on human cognition can provide numerous practical insights into the nature
of human behavior. For example, one of the hard lessons of life is that it is remarkably difficult to convince
others of anything, much less change their behavior in any meaningful way, through the pure application of
reason and logic. Instead, you have to somehow find a way into the deep recesses of the goal hierarchy, and
drive the activation of goals that lead to the desired behaviors. The flip side of this point is captured in the
central theme of Buddhist philosophy, which is that the positive feedback dynamics of goal attachments are
very strong, and will tend to dominate our lives, unless we consciously work to counteract them. Thus, we
cannot be psychologically free unless we escape the goal engaged state. And yet, the goal engaged state is
fundamental to producing the state of happiness. Amid these and many other contradictory forces, we must
each find our own balance, but perhaps an awareness of the forces at work in our brains will enable people
to understand why they feel the way they do, and make better informed decisions about how to proceed.
At a more practical level, the goal-driven framework can help us understand why procrastination is so
prevalent. From this framework, procrastination represents the selection of goals that have a better overall
net utility compared to the more onerous thing that you actually need to be doing. In other words, you select
things that are easier and/or result in more immediate, positive outcomes. When you look at it this way,
procrastination is completely rational, and we have emphasized that the goal selection process represents
the most rational weighing of options. However, once you become goal engaged, this careful weighing goes
out the window. Thus, the key step for avoiding procrastination is to somehow trick yourself into getting
started on that big task you need to do, so that you can then leverage the goal engaged positive feedback loop.
And the trick to getting started is to make the first step extremely easy and immediate — if you’re blocked on
starting a paper, just set a goal of writing the title. Or the methods. Or any little part of it that is the easiest.
Maybe it is making the figures. In any case, once you get started, then the goal engaged dynamics kick in,
and off you go! Just make sure not to hit any major roadblocks along the way, because those will certainly
trigger a new round of goal selection. Interestingly, recent research shows that the tendency to procrastinate
is strongly associated with impulsivity (the two are identical at a latent genetic level) (Gustavson, Miyake,
Hewitt, & Friedman, 2014Steel, 2007), which is consistent with the goal selection framework: impulsive
decision makers tend to focus on more immediate positive outcomes, and those are exactly the goals that
interfere with making progress on a more difficult task, prior to when it is absolutely essential.
One other interesting connection with daily life, and an active area of current research, is in terms of the
extensive amount of time that people spend ruminating about possible future goals and plans, and reconsid-
ering the outcomes of prior ones. Specifically, this is one of the leading hypotheses for what goes on during
the so-called default mode of cognition, which is characterized by a network of brain areas that overlap
significantly with those of the goal network (Figure 9). This default mode network appears to be engaged
whenever people are not otherwise engaged in an active task, and it could be characterized as a third funda-
mental state of goal-driven processing: episodically-driven reevaluation and planning of future goal states,
so that when the time comes, you will have more thoroughly worked out the possible consequences and
outcomes associated with different action plans, and formulated a set of possible goal/plan representations
that can be more easily activated in the appropriate circumstances.
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Conclusions
Although we have reached the end of the paper, the end of the story (and the moment of goal achievement
satisfaction) awaits considerable more work to build on the very preliminary work here in implementing
computational models, and determining what works and what doesn’t. Many possible experiments can be
conducted to test these ideas, and hopefully the more detailed predictions of our implemented models.
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Appendix: Computational Model Details
This appendix provides more information about the emery foraging model. The pur-
pose of this information is to give more detailed insight into the model’s function beyond
the level provided in the main text, but with a model of this complexity, the only way
to really understand it is to explore the model itself. It is available for download at
http://grey.colorado.edu/CompCogNeuro/index.php/CCN_Repository. And the best
way to understand this model is to understand the framework in which it is implemented, which is ex-
plained in great detail, with many running simulations explaining specific elements of functionality, at
http://ccnbook.colorado.edu.
Model Training
The model was trained in a sequence of stages, designed to capture in the end some rough approximation
of the relevant functionality present in a rat performing in a simple plus maze environment. Each individual
training stage is not intended to be a completely realistic model of how this functionality actually develops
in a rat, however — that is a larger and important research agenda that we are hoping to make progress
on. Each stage of training typically turns on an increasing number of layers in the network, as needed to
accomplish that stage. The tags for each stage are the configuration id’s of the relevant stage as actually
implemented in the model.
• vision train: This drives random motor exploration in the environment to train up the visual sys-
tem (V1, V4, Object) so that the output layer of the visual system reports what is being seen
(these are the only layers turned on for this stage). The target outputs are generated by consider-
ing the orientation and position of the rat, and thus inferring what it should be looking at. This
produces highly accurate Object representations that can recognize each of the landmarks based
on both shape and color information. See O’Reilly et al. (2013) and the objrec simulation in
http://ccnbook.colorado.edu for more information about how the visual system learns.
In brief, it learns increasingly spatially invariant and featurally complex representations as it proceeds
up the pathway. Given the simplicity of these stimuli, we did not need an IT layer.
• match train: This trains the Match layer to compute whether the Object and Target layers have a
matching representation, which is then a useful abstraction for the motor program to operate from.
This randomly presents inputs to the Object and Target layers, and trains the appropriate Match re-
sponse. We have found that the motor system does learn without the benefit of this Match layer, but it
is much faster and more reliable with it.
• motor train: This trains the dlPFC Hid layer to generate proper SMA out motor actions (left = turn
left, middle = go forward, right = turn right) based on visual input relative to target, such that rat
will rotate until a match occurs, and then it moves forward to approach. We assume that this kind
of approach-a-target motor program is something that rats learn relatively quickly in life (if they are
not born with it in some way) — we are currently developing models that explore how such motor
programs could be learned in a more ecologically-valid fashion.
• explore env: This turns on all of the gdPVLV layers, and the OFC and ACC layers, and does initial
exploration of the environment for the affective system. It trains the OFC, ACC, BLA, and CeM
layers to know which rewards occur where, and what visual inputs they’re associated with. A key
outcome of this is that the PosLV OFC units learn to activate the proper Target layer for a given target
PV outcome.
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• goal learn: This is the final stage which was described in detail in the main text. It alternates between
goal selection and goal enaged modes, and demonstrates basic full loop operation of deciding what it
wants, and going to get it, based on all the above prior learning.
Model Algorithms
The model was implemented using the Leabra framework, which is described in detail in O’Reilly et al.
(2012), O’Reilly and Munakata (2000), O’Reilly (2001), and summarized here. See Table 1 for a listing
of parameter values, nearly all of which are at their default settings. These same parameters and equations
have been used to simulate over 40 different models in O’Reilly et al. (2012) and O’Reilly and Munakata
(2000), and a number of other research models. Thus, the model can be viewed as an instantiation of a
systematic modeling framework using standardized mechanisms, instead of constructing new mechanisms
for each model.
This version of Leabra contains three primary differences from the original (O’Reilly & Munakata,
2000): the activation function is slightly different, in a way that allows units to more accurately reflect their
graded excitatory input drive, the inhibition function is much simpler and more biologically realistic, and
the learning rule takes a more continuous form involving contrasts between values integrated over different
time frames (i.e., with different time constants), which also produces a combination of error-driven and self-
organizing learning within the same simple mathematical framework. These modifications are described
in detail in an updated version of the O’Reilly and Munakata (2000) textbook, in O’Reilly et al. (2012).
This new learning algorithm goes by the acronym of XCAL (temporally eXtended Contrastive Attractor
Learning), and it replaces the combination of Contrastive Hebbian Learning (CHL) and standard Hebbian
learning used in the original Leabra framework.
Pseudocode
The pseudocode for Leabra is given here, showing exactly how the pieces of the algorithm described in
more detail in the subsequent sections fit together. The individual steps are repeated for each event (trial),
which can be broken down into a minus and plus phase, followed by a synaptic weight updating function.
Generally speaking, the minus phase represents the system’s expectation for a given input and the plus phase
represents the observation of the outcome. The difference between these two phases is then used to compute
the updating function that drives learning. Furthermore, each phase contains a period of settling (measured
in cycles) during which the activation values of each unit are updated taking into account the previous state
of the network. Some units are clamped, or have fixed activation values and are not subject to this updating
rule (e.g., V1 input in the minus phase, V1 input and Output in the plus phase).
Outer loop: For each event (trial) in an epoch:
1. Iterate over minus and plus phases of settling for each event.
(a) At start of settling, for all units:
i. Initialize all state variables (activation, Vm, etc).
ii. Clamp external patterns (V1 input in minus phase, V1 input & Output in plus phase).
(b) During each cycle of settling, for all non-clamped units:
i. Compute excitatory netinput (ge(t) or ηj , eq 7).
ii. Compute FFFB inhibition for each layer, based on average net input and activation levels
within the layer (eq 13)
iii. Compute point-neuron activation combining excitatory input and inhibition (eq 5).
iv. Update time-averaged activation values (short, medium, long) for use in learning.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
El 0.30 gl 0.10
Ei 0.25 gi 1.00
Ee 1.00 ge 1.00
Vrest 0.30 Θ 0.50
τ .3 γ 80
Table 1: Parameters for the simulation (see equations in text for explanations of parameters). All are standard default
parameter values.
2. After both phases update the weights, for all connections:
(a) Compute XCAL learning as function of short, medium, and long time averages.
(b) Increment the weights according to net weight change.
Point Neuron Activation Function
Leabra uses a point neuron activation function that models the electrophysiological properties of real
neurons, while simplifying their geometry to a single point. This function is nearly as simple computation-
ally as the standard sigmoidal activation function, but the more biologically-based implementation makes it
considerably easier to model inhibitory competition, as described below. Further, using this function enables
cognitive models to be more easily related to more physiologically detailed simulations, thereby facilitating
bridge-building between biology and cognition. We use normalized units where the unit of time is 1 msec,
the unit of electrical potential is 0.1 V (with an offset of -0.1 for membrane potentials and related terms,
such that their normal range stays within the [0, 1] normalized bounds), and the unit of current is 1.0x10−8.
The membrane potential Vm is updated as a function of ionic conductances g with reversal (driving)
potentials E as follows:
∆Vm(t) = τ
∑
c
gc(t)gc(Ec − Vm(t)) (5)
with 3 channels (c) corresponding to: e excitatory input; l leak current; and i inhibitory input. Following
electrophysiological convention, the overall conductance is decomposed into a time-varying component
gc(t) computed as a function of the dynamic state of the network, and a constant gc that controls the relative
influence of the different conductances. The equilibrium potential can be written in a simplified form by
setting the excitatory driving potential (Ee) to 1 and the leak and inhibitory driving potentials (El and Ei)
of 0:
V∞m =
gege
gege + glgl + gigi
(6)
which shows that the neuron is computing a balance between excitation and the opposing forces of leak and
inhibition. This equilibrium form of the equation can be understood in terms of a Bayesian decision making
framework (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000).
The excitatory net input/conductance ge(t) or ηj is computed as the proportion of open excitatory chan-
nels as a function of sending activations times the weight values:
ηj = ge(t) = 〈xiwij〉 = 1
n
∑
i
xiwij (7)
The inhibitory conductance is computed via the kWTA function described in the next section, and leak is a
constant.
58 Goal-Driven Cognition
In its discrete spiking mode, Leabra implements exactly the AdEx (adaptive exponential) model
(Brette & Gerstner, 2005), which has been found through various competitions to provide an excellent
fit to the actual firing properties of cortical pyramidal neurons (Wulfram & Richard, 2009), while remaining
simple and efficient to implement. However, we typically use a rate-code approximation to discrete firing,
which produces smoother more deterministic activation dynamics, while capturing the overall firing rate
behavior of the discrete spiking model.
We recently discovered that our previous strategy of computing a rate-code graded activation value di-
rectly from the membrane potential is problematic, because the mapping between Vm and mean firing rate
is not a one-to-one function in the AdEx model. Instead, we have found that a very accurate approximation
to the discrete spiking rate can be obtained by comparing the excitatory net input directly with the effective
computed amount of net input required to get the neuron firing over threshold (gΘe ), where the threshold is
indicated by Θ:
gΘe =
gigi(Ei − V Θm ) + gl(El − V Θm )
ge(V
Θ
m − Ee)
(8)
yj(t) ∝ ge(t)− gΘe (9)
where yj(t) is the firing rate output of the unit.
We continue to use the Noisy X-over-X-plus-1 (NXX1) function, which starts out with a nearly linear
function, followed by a saturating nonlinearity:
yj(t) =
1(
1 + 1
γ[ge(t)−gΘe ]+
) (10)
where γ is a gain parameter, and [x]+ is a threshold function that returns 0 if x < 0 and x if x > 0. Note
that if it returns 0, we assume yj(t) = 0, to avoid dividing by 0. As it is, this function has a very sharp
threshold, which interferes with graded learning learning mechanisms (e.g., gradient descent). To produce a
less discontinuous deterministic function with a softer threshold, the function is convolved with a Gaussian
noise kernel (µ = 0, σ = .005), which reflects the intrinsic processing noise of biological neurons:
y∗j (x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσ
e−z
2/(2σ2)yj(z − x)dz (11)
where x represents the [ge(t) − gΘe ]+ value, and y∗j (x) is the noise-convolved activation for that value. In
the simulation, this function is implemented using a numerical lookup table.
There is just one last problem with the equations as written above: They don’t evolve over time in
a graded fashion. In contrast, the Vm value does evolve in a graded fashion by virtue of being iteratively
computed, where it incrementally approaches the equilibrium value over a number of time steps of updating.
Instead the activation produced by the above equations goes directly to its equilibrium value very quickly,
because it is calculated based on excitatory conductance and does not take into account the sluggishness
with which changes in conductance lead to changes in membrane potentials (due to capacitance).
To introduce graded iterative dynamics into the activation function, we just use the activation value
(y∗(x)) from the above equation as a ”driving force” to an iterative temporally-extended update equation:
yj(t) = yj(t− 1) + dtvm
(
y∗j (t)− yj(t− 1)
)
(12)
This causes the actual final rate code activation output at the current time t, y(t) to iteratively approach
the driving value given by y∗(x), with the same time constant dtvm that is used in updating the membrane
potential. In practice this works extremely well, better than any prior activation function used with Leabra.
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FFFB Inhibition
Leabra computes a layer-level inhibition conductance value based on a combination of feed-forward
(FF) and feed-back (FB) dynamics. This is an advance over the more explicit kWTA (k-Winners-Take-
All) function that was used previously, though it achieves roughly the same overall kWTA behavior, with a
much simpler, more efficient, and biologically plausible formulation. The FF component is based directly
on the average excitatory net input coming into the layer (< η >), and the FB component is based on the
average activation of units within the layer (< act >). Remarkably, fixed gain factors on each of these
terms, together with simple time integration of the FB term to prevent oscillations, produces results that are
overall comparable to the kWTA dynamics, except that the activations of units in the layer retain more of a
proportional response to their overall level of excitatory drive, which is desirable in many cases.
FFFB is conceptually just the sum of the FF and FB components, each with their own ff and fb gain
factors, with an overall gain factor (gi) applied to both:
gi = gi (ff[< η > −ff0]+ + fb < act >) (13)
where [x]+ indicates the positive part of whatever it contains – anything negative truncates to zero. It is im-
portant to have a small offset on the FF component, parameterized by ff0 which is typically .1 — this delays
the onset of inhibition and allows the neurons to get a little bit active first. To minimize oscillations, the
feedback component needs to be time integrated, with a fast time constant of .7 – just a simple exponential
approach to the driving fb inhibition value was used:
fbi(t) = fbi(t− 1) + dt ( fb < act > −fbi(t− 1)) (14)
Typically ff is set to 1.0, fb is 0.5, and the overall gain (gi) is manipulated to achieve desired activity levels
– typically it is around 2.2 or so.
XCAL Learning
The full treatment of the new XCAL version of learning in Leabra is presented in O’Reilly et al. (2012),
but the basic equations and a brief motivation for them are presented here.
In the original Leabra algorithm, learning was the sum of two terms: an error-driven component and a
Hebbian self-organizing component. In the new XCAL formulation, the error-driven and self-organizing
factors emerge out of a single learning rule, which was derived from a biologically detailed model of synap-
tic plasticity by Urakubo et al. (Urakubo, Honda, Froemke, & Kuroda, 2008), and is closely related to
the Bienenstock, Cooper & Munro (BCM) algorithm (Bienenstock, Cooper, & Munro, 1982). In BCM, a
Hebbian-like sender-receiver activation product term is modulated by the extent to which the receiving unit
is above or below a long-term running average activation value:
∆bcmwij = xy(y − 〈y2〉) (15)
(x = sender activation, y = receiver activation, and 〈y2〉 = long-term average of squared receiver activa-
tion). The long-term average value acts like a dynamic plasticity threshold, and causes less-active units to
increase their weights, while more-active units tend to decrease theirs (i.e., a classic homeostatic function).
This form of learning resembles Hebbian learning in several respects, but can learn higher-order statistics,
whereas Hebbian learning is more constrained to extract low-order correlational statistics. Furthermore,
the BCM model may provide a better account of various experimental data, such as monocular deprivation
experiments (Cooper, Intrator, Blais, & Shouval, 2004).
The Leabra XCAL learning rule is based on a contrast between a sender-receiver activation product
term (shown initially as just xy – relevant time scales of averaging for this term are elaborated below) and a
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Figure 11: XCAL dWt function, shown with θp = 0.5, which determines the cross-over point between negative and
positive weight changes, and θpθd determines the inflection point at the left where the curve goes from a negative slope
to a positive slope. This function fits the results of the highly detailed Urakubo et al (Urakubo et al., 2008) model,
with a correlation value of r = 0.89.
dynamic plasticity threshold θp (also elaborated below), which are integrated in the XCAL learning function
(Figure 11):
∆xcalwij = fxcal(xy, θp) (16)
where the XCAL learning function was derived by fitting a piecewise-linear function to the Urakubo et al
(Urakubo et al., 2008) simulation results based on synaptic drive levels (sender and receiver firing rates; the
resulting fit was very good, with a correlation of r = 0.89):
fxcal(xy, θp) =
{
(xy − θp) if xy > θpθd
−xy(1− θd)/θd otherwise (17)
(θd = .1 is a constant that determines the point where the function reverses back toward zero within the
weight decrease regime – this reversalpoint occurs at θpθd, so that it adapts according to the dynamic θp
value).
The BCM equation produces a curved quadratic function that has the same qualitative shape as the
XCAL function (Figure 11). A critical feature of these functions is that they go to 0 as the synaptic activity
goes to 0, which is in accord with available data, and that they exhibit a crossover point from LTD to LTP
as a function of synaptic drive (which is represented biologically by intracellular Calcium levels). A nice
advantage of the linear XCAL function is that, to first approximation, it is just computing the subtraction
xy − θp.
To achieve full error-driven learning within this XCAL framework, we just need to ensure that the core
subtraction represents an error-driven learning term. In the original Leabra, error-driven learning via the
Contrastive Hebbian Learning algorithm (CHL) was computed as:
∆chl = x
+y+ − x−y− (18)
where the superscripts represent the plus (+) and minus (−) phases. This equation was shown to compute
the same error gradient as the backpropagation algorithm, subject to symmetry and a 2nd-order numer-
ical integration technique known as the midpoint method, based the generalized recirculation algorithm
(GeneRec; (O’Reilly, 1996)). In XCAL, we replace these values with time-averaged activations computed
over different time scales:
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• s = short time scale, reflecting the most recent state of neural activity (e.g., past 100-200 msec). This
is considered the “plus phase” – it represents the outcome information on the current trial, and in
general should be more correct than the medium time scale.
• m = medium time scale, which integrates over an entire psychological “trial” of roughly a second or
so – this value contains a mixture of the “minus phase” and the “plus phase”, but in contrasting it
with the short value, it plays the role of the minus phase value, or expectation about what the system
thought should have happened on the current trial.
• l = long time scale, which integrates over hours to days of processing – this is the BCM-like threshold
term.
Thus, the error-driven aspect of XCAL learning is driven essentially by the following term:
∆xcal−errwij = fxcal(xsys, xmym) (19)
However, consider the case where either of the short term values (xs or ys) is 0, while both of the medium-
term values are > 0 – from an error-driven learning perspective, this should result in a significant weight
decrease, but because the XCAL function goes back to 0 when the input drive term is 0, the result is no
weight change at all. To remedy this situation, we assume that the short-term value actually retains a small
trace of the medium-term value:
∆xcal−errwij = fxcal(κxsys + (1− κ)xmym, xmym) (20)
(where κ = .9, such that only .1 of the medium-term averages are incorporated into the effective short-term
average).
The self-organizing aspect of XCAL is driven by comparing this same synaptic drive term to a longer-
term average, as in the BCM algorithm:
∆xcal−sowij = fxcal(κxsys + (1− κ)xmym, γlyl) (21)
where γl = 3 is a constant that scales the long-term average threshold term (due to sparse activation levels,
these long-term averages tend to be rather low, so the larger gain multiplier is necessary to make this term
relevant whenever the units actually are active and adapting their weights).
Combining both of these forms of learning in the full XCAL learning rule amounts to computing an
aggregate θp threshold that reflects a combination of both the self-organizing long-term average, and the
medium-term minus-phase like average:
∆xcalwij = fxcal(κxsys + (1− κ)xmym, λγyl + (1− λ)xmym) (22)
where λ = .01 is a weighting factor determining the mixture of self-organizing and error-driven learning
influences (as was the case with standard Leabra, the balance of error-driven and self-organizing is heav-
ily weighted toward error driven, because error-gradients are often quite weak in comparison with local
statistical information that the self-organizing system encodes).
The weight changes are subject to a soft-weight bounding to keep within the 0− 1 range:
∆sbwij = [∆xcal]+(1− wij) + [∆xcal]−wij (23)
where the []+ and []− operators extract positive values or negative-values (respectively), otherwise 0.
Finally, as in the original Leabra model, the weights are subject to contrast enhancement, which mag-
nifies the stronger weights and shrinks the smaller ones in a parametric, continuous fashion. This contrast
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enhancement is achieved by passing the linear weight values computed by the learning rule through a sig-
moidal nonlinearity of the following form:
wˆij =
1
1 +
(
wij
θ(1−wij)
)−γ (24)
where wˆij is the contrast-enhanced weight value, and the sigmoidal function is parameterized by an offset θ
and a gain γ (standard defaults of 1 and 6, respectively, used here).
